KUSA MAJHI Vs. STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The appellant stands convicted under S.302 of the Indian Penal Code ('the Code', for short) and sentenced thereunder to undergo imprisonment for life by the trial court after accepting the case of the prosecution thai on June 16, 1979, the appellant killed his mother by dealing blows by means of an axe (M.O.I) on her shoulder which caused internal injuries and resulted in her death. It is not necessary for us to go into the facts of the case in details as at the hearing of this appeal, Mr. Misra, appearing for the appellant, has not assailed the finding that the appellant did assault his mother to death by dealing blows by means of M.O.I and indeed, the finding cannot be assailed in view of the clear, cogent and acceptable evidence of the wife of the appellant examined for the prosecution as P.W.6 who was a natural and competent witness and had snatched away M.O.I from the hands of the appellant to prevent further assault and the extra judicial confession made by the appellant before P.Ws.3 to 5 which would read well and had rightly been accepted by the trial court. Mr. Misra has, however, raised two contentions, viz.,

(2.) S.84 of the Code reads :

(3.) In the instant case, no specific plea of insanity had been raised by the appellant at the trial. On the other hand, the appellant had stated that previously his mind was not working properly, but that he had become all right and he had been doing his work. No materials had been brought out by the defence in the prosecution evidence in this regard and no such plea could be spelt out of the evidence on record. The defence had brought out in the cross-examination of witnesses, to which reference had been made by the trial court, that prior to the occurrence, the appellant was moody, had not been doing work at home and was indulging in incoherent talks for which he had been treated for some time. It was also in evidence that at times, the appellant used to talk to himself and this habit of his had continued up to the date of occurrence. From these facts, it could not be assumed that the appellant was insane at the time the occurrence took place. If the appellant had any menial depression, it could not be equated with legal insanity.