PURUSOTTAM PANI Vs. DHRUBA CHARAN PANDA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Opposite party No. 3 filed a suit on a promissory note for recovery of dues against opposite parties 1 and 2. The rice huller machine belonging to opposite parties 1 and 2 was attached before judgment. On 1-4-1971 the Civil Court peon after attachment left the huller in charge of the petitioner who executed a receipt on that day wherein he stated that the rice huller was kept in his custody by the peon and he gave an undertaking that he would produce the huller as and when orders would be issued by the court. In the recitals of the undertaking so given there was no personal liability taken by the petitioner. The undertaking was not in favour of the Presiding Officer or any other officer of the Court. It was an under-faking in favour of the Court. On 1-3-1974 opposite parties 1 and 2 filed an application in Court that the petitioner should be directed to nay Rs. 2100/- towards electric charges and Rs. 5500/- towards profits which he gained by the running of the huller for a period of about 11 months when the huller was in his custody. The petitioner filed objection saying that he did not run the huller and did not make any profits. He also said that the claim was beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the court and the Court had no jurisdiction to direct an enquiry regarding compensation in the suit, and opposite parties 1 and 2 can have remedy only by way of a separate suit. The trial Court by his order dated 6-3-1974 held that he had jurisdiction to make an enquiry. It is against this order that the civil revision has been filed.

(2.) Mr. B. Patnaik for the petitioner does not press the point that on account of higher pecuniary value of the claim the court has no jurisdiction to make the enquiry. The only contention urged by him is that the court has no jurisdiction to direct an enquiry and the only remedy that opposite parties 1 and 2 have is to make a claim by way of a separate suit.

(3.) It is the common case of the parties that section 145 C. P. C. has no application to this case. Section 145 runs thus:--