LAWS(ORI)-1984-7-9

NURUN NISHA BEGUM Vs. HASINA KHATUN

Decided On July 10, 1984
NURUN NISHA BEGUM Appellant
V/S
HASINA KHATUN Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The appellant was the complainant and the respondents were the accused persons facing trial for commission of offences punishable under Sections 3 & 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (for short, the Act) and under Sec. 6-A(1) of the said Act as amended by the Dowry Prohibition (Orissa Amendment) Act, 1975, in the court of the learned Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate, Sambalpur. The case of the appellant was that the respondent No. 3 married the appellant on May 8, 1975. There had been demands for dowry by the appellants prior to the marriage and even thereafter for which the appellant had been ill-treated. It was also alleged that the respondent No. 3 had denied conjugal rights to the appellant for the same reason. Besides examining herself as P.W. 9, the appellant had examined eight witnesses to substantiate her case. The respondents plea was one of denial and false implication. One witness had been examined for the defence to show that the respondent No. 3 had divorced the appellant in March, 1976. At the trial, the case under Section 3 of the Act was not pressed. The learned Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate found and rightly so, that no case had been made out under Section 6-A(1) of the Act. The trial court held that the prohibition with regard to the dowry would apply only to the demand of dowry prior to the marriage and on a consideration of the evidence, found that the evidence in this regard was not satisfactory. The respondents were thus acquitted.

(2.) Mr. Mund, appearing for the appellant, has not challenged the order of acquittal in respect of the offence punishable under Section 3 of the Act. The allegation in respect of Section 6-A of the Act had not been substantiated and the finding in this regard cannot be assailed. As regards Section 4 of the Act, Mr. Mund has challenged the findings recorded by the trial court as unreasonable. It has been contended by him that the finding recorded by the learned Magistrate that the prohibition with regard to the dowry would be only in respect of the demand of dowry prior to the marriage cannot be sustained in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in L. V. Jadhav v. Shankarrao Abasaheb Pawar and others.1

(3.) Mr. Rahenoma, appearing for the respondents, has supported the order of acquittal. He has taken a legal ground that the prosecution of the respondents for commission of an offence punishable under Section 4 of the Act was illegal as no court could take cognizance of any offence under this section except with the previous sanction of the State Government or of such other officer as the State Government may by general or special order specify in this behalf.