LAWS(ORI)-1954-9-8

A KRISHNA RAO Vs. STATE OF ORISSA

Decided On September 22, 1954
A.KRISHNA RAO Appellant
V/S
STATE OF ORISSA Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This petition has been filed by Sri A. Krishna Rao, a pleader practising in the Court of the District Judge of Cuttack, who was the opposite party in --'State of Orissa v. A. Krishna Rao', AIR 1955 Ori 46 (A) which was disposed of by a Special Beach of this Court the Judgment being dated 29-4-1954. That was a reference made by the District Judge of Cuttack under 3. 14, Legal Practitioners Act, in a proceeding against the, pleader, Sri A. Krishna Rao, for having committed an act which was grossly improper in the discharge of his professional duty, In the judgment D/- 29-4-1954, the Special Bench found the pleader clearly guilty of gross misconduct in the discharge of his professional duty and, as such, he is liable to disciplinary action under the Legal Practitioners Act. But on account of the reason that the pleader is an inexperienced junior lawyer an order of reprimand was thought adequate to meet the ends of justice. The Special Bench, however, ordered the pleader to pay the costs of the reference and assessed the hearing fee at Rs. 100/-. It is against this order for payment of cost the present petition has been filed by Mr. Mohanty on behalf of the pleader.

(2.) Mr. Mohanty strenuously contends that the order for costs is without jurisdiction as there is no such power given to the Court under the provisions of the Legal Practitioners Act. The proceeding was started under Section 13 of the Act for professional misconduct of pleader and order was passed under Section 14 of the Act. According to Mr. Mohanty, the powers of the Court are confined, to pass an order "to acquit, suspend or dismiss" the pleader or muktear as contained in Section 14 of the Act. He further argues that the statutory provisions conferring powers to award costs are contained in Section 35, Civil P. C.; but the proceedings under the Legal Practitioners Act being quasi criminal, the Civil Procedure Code has no application and the Court could not pass an order for costs in exercise of its powers under Section 35, Civil P. C.

(3.) Apart from the provisions of Section 35 of the Code the High Court has wide discretion in exercise of its inherent powers to award costs in suitable cases, if it finds it necessary in the interest of Justice to do so. Without discussing the matter any further, we may observe the matter is covered by the best authority on the point that is, a decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of -- 'A pleader of Agra v. Judges of the Allahabad High Court', AIR 1930 PC 60 (B). In that case the pleader who was the Standing Counsel for the Agra United Mills Limited, for 6 years, was guilty of gross misconduct in having accepted a brief for the plaintiffs debenture-holders and filed the suit on 14-5-27 against the aforesaid company. The High Court of Allahabad suspended him from practising for 4 years and further passed an order that the legal practitioner must pay costs of Rs. 1100/-. Their Lordships of the Privy Council modified the order" of suspension passed by the Allahabad High Court for 4 years to the effect that the order of suspension which was to commence from 23-1-1928 is to cease on 22-11-1929. But their Lordships of the Privy Council' made it clear "but without any variation in that order so far as it relates to costs". It appears manifest that the order for costs passed by the Allahabad High Court was confirmed by their Lordships of the Privy Council as being within their jurisdiction and a contrary contention was never taken before their Lordships even though a very eminent counsel like A.M. Dunne was appearing on behalf of the appellant legal practitioner in the case. This decision was cited before a Special Bench of the Madras High Court consisting of Leach C. J., Lakshmana Rao and Krishnaswami Ayyangar JJ. In the case reported in 'A Pleader, in the matter of', AIR 1943 Mad 250 (SB) (C) in support of the contention that the High Court has power to award costs in a proceeding under the Legal Practitioners Act. This very point arose for determination in the case, as it appears from the very first sentence of the judgment of Leach C. J. : "This question raises the question whether the Court has power to award costs against a pleader charging him with professional misconduct". The judgment of the Allahabad High Court does not appear in the report published in 'AIR 1930 PC 60 (B)'. But a copy of the judgment of the Allahabad High Court was obtained and placed before their Lordships of the Madras High Court. Their Lordships, respectfully following the decision of the Privy Council laid down the proposition in unambiguous terms that in a proceeding under Sections 14 and 15 of the Legal Practitioners Act, a subordinate Court has no power to award costs, but the High Court can, if it deems it just, itself pass an order for the payment of costs. The case before the Madras High Court was one under Section 15 of the Act and their Lordships observed that when the High Court has power to award costs under Section 14 of the Act as is transparent from the judgment of their Lordships of the Privy Council, it must also have power to make an order lor costs in a case under Section 15 of the Act. There is also another decision of the Madras High Court reported in -- 'Venkata Rao v. Motiram', AIR 1815 Mad 400 (1) (D) where Kumaraswamy Bastri J. observed: