GOBINDA MALLIA Vs. UCO BANK

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner, who was working as Daftary in the opposite party-Bank, files this petition seeking to quash the order dated 25.10.2004 (Annexure-1) rejecting his representation for release of arrear salary for the period of his suspension from 26.10.1992 to 6.12.2001.

(2.) The factual matrix of the case, in hand, is that the petitioner entered into service under the opposite party-Bank in the year 1978. He was placed under suspension while in service by order dated 26.10.1992 vide Annexure-2 as he was arrested in connection with a criminal case and was sent to jail custody. The petitioner faced the criminal prosecution, which was ultimately ended in acquittal in the Court of learned Addl.Sessions Judge, Bhubaneswar in S.T.No.17/18/345 of 1996/95 and S.T.No.18/21/380 of 1996/95 vide judgment dated 31.7.2002 (Annexure-3). Against the said order of acquittal, the appeal as preferred to this Court in CRLLP No.66 of 2003 which was also dismissed vide order dated 12.2.2004 in Annexure-4. The petitioner, who was continuing under suspension on account of delay in disposal of the criminal case was reinstated in service on 2.12.2001 vide Annexure-5. The petitioner claims that after acquittal in the criminal case the period of suspension should have been treated as duty for all purposes and benefit should be extended to him suo motu by the Bank for the period 26.10.1992 to 6.12.2001. The petitioner also made a representation for extension of such benefits, which rejected vide order dated 25.1.2004 vide Annexure-1, against which this petition.

(3.) Mr. R.K.Rath, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner strenuously urged that the reasons assigned for rejection of the representation in the impugned order in Annexrue-1 that under Clause No.19.3(C) of Bipartite Settlement, if an employee is acquitted in a criminal case on the benefit of doubt, he may be paid such portion of such pay and allowance as the Management may deem proper and the period of his absence shall not be treated as period spent on duty unless the management so directs, are not correct. He further urged that as the prosecution could not be able to prove its case "beyond all reasonable doubt", the petitioner was acquitted from all the charges, but while rejecting his representation, an erroneous interpretation has been made that the petitioner has been acquitted on "benefit of doubt". According to Mr.Rath, rejection of the representation on the ground of "benefit of doubt" is not the same as release of the petitioner "beyond all reasonable doubt". By making such wrong interpretation, benefit has been denied to the petitioner, which itself amounts to non-application of mind by the authorities. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance on the judgment of the apex Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, 1984 AIR(SC) 1622