SARDOOL SINGH Vs. UNION OF INDIA UOI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE petitioner was a fire fighter and a Head Constable under the Central Industrial Security Force. He had been so appointed on August 2, 1988 temporarily vide Annexure 2 with the stipulation that he would be on probation for a period of two years, but in the event of his being found unsuitable for retention in the post at any time, either during the period of initial training or in the period of probation, his service would be terminated in accordance with the provisions of Rule 19of the Central Industrial Security Force Rules, 1969 (for short, 'the Rules') and paragraph 2 of the Agreement executed with the President of India. On June 8, 1989, an accident took place and in Memo dated 15/16 June, 1989 (Annexure-3) it was stated that the petitioner while driving the fire-fighting vehicle, lost control over the same due to high speed and careless driving, as a result of which the vehicle overturned on the road causing extensive damage to the same as well as injuries to the fire crews. He was asked by that memo to explain as to why disciplinary action shall not be taken against him. The petitioner submitted his explanation stating inter alia, that near the spot of the accident he heard a sound (Dhaka Dhaka) from the backside of the vehicle and when he tried to stop the same, the right hand back wheel touched the foot-path and the vehicle immediately turned down. So, the defence was that it was a sort of mechanical failure which caused the accident. The impugned order of termination as at Annexure-5 dated March 5, 1990 thereafter followed stating that the same was being done under Clause 2 (a) of the Agreement executed by the petitioner under Rule 15 read with Rule 19 of the Rules. This order has been assailed by the petitioner on the assertion that this was not a case of termination simpliciter but an act of punishment which had been imposed without complying with the principles of natural justice, and so, the order is bad in the eye of law.

(2.) AS the termination order had come to be passed during the probationary period of the petitioner, it is contended by Shri Misra appearing for the opposite parties that as the impugned order has cast no stigma on the face of it and as the Rules as well as the contract of service permitted the employer to terminate the service of the petitioner, the same cannot at all be regarded as an act of punishment, because of which principles of natural justice were not required to be complied with, or, for that matter, the provisions contained in the Rules relating to imposition of penalty. The learned counsel submits that the facts of the case as they are do not permit us to lift the veil to find out what has really prompted the authorities to pass the impugned order, specially when there is no allegation of mala fide.

(3.) AS to when termination of service, of a probationer amounts to punishment has been a vexed question of law. Right from Dhingra's case, 1958-I-LLJ-544 which is regarded as Magna Carta for service holders, it is, however, an accepted position that the service of a temporary employee (which would apply equally to a probationer) can be spensed with in pursuance of the terms of the contract or the rules holding the field; the termination of the service of a temporary employee may also be inflicted as a punishment. This will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case.