SATRUGHANA DALABEHERA AND ORS. Vs. STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE Petitioners, alleged to have committed an offence of dacoity with other companion -culprits during the night of the 20th/21st July, 1982, in the house of the first informant Kirtan Sahu at Jagannath prasad in the district of Puri, invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short, 'the Code') to quash the orders passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate at Daspalla taking cognisance of the offence on the basis of the charge -sheet placed against them and seven others showing the Petitioners as absconders and thereafter refusing to interfere when an application was made to rescind the order taking cognisance and to quash the criminal proceeding against them. Appearing on their behalf, Mr. Dhal has contended that save and except the statement of a co -accused person, namely, Narayan Behera, recorded in the course of investigation, which cannot take the place of legal evidence, there is no other material to connect the Petitioners or any of them with the commission of the offence and therefore, the learned Magistrate went legally wrong in taking cognisance and proceed in against them, It has been submitted by the learned Standing Counsel for the State that besides the statement of the co -accused Narahari, there is no other material against the Petitioners, but as the Petitioners are accused of an offence of dacoity triable by the Court of Session, the matter be better left to the Court of trial to find out this aspect.

(2.) THE inherent jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a criminal proceeding is to be exercised in a proper case to prevent an abuse of the process of the court or to secure the ends of justice. Where the allegations in the first information report or in the complaint, even on their face value and if accepted in entirety, do not constitute an offence the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a proceeding can be exercised. See R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab : A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 866, Superintendent and Ramembrancer of Legal Affairs, W.B. v. Mohan Singh and Ors. : A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1002 and Dr. Sharda Prasad Sinha v. State of Bihar : A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1754. As has been laid down by the Supreme Court in the well -known case of Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra : A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 47, in case the impugned order clearly brings about a situation which is an abuse of the process of the court or for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, interference by the High Court is absolutely necessary, the High Court may exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code. This power, however, is to be exercised very sparingly but criminal proceedings instituted illegally or vexatiously or without jurisdiction should be quashed. At the stage of finding out as to whether a criminal proceeding is to be quashed, this Court is not to appreciate the evidence or the materials on which the complainant seeks reliance and on the basis of which cognisance of the offence has been taken nor to assess the evidence or to judge the probabilities or improbabilities in the case. At the same time, the Court cannot be oblivious of the tendency of a litigant person to implicate others by deliberately making false insinuations. As has been observed by the Supreme Court in State of West Bengal v. Swapan Kumar : A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 949 the liberty and property of any individual are sacred and sacrosanct and the court zealously guards them and protects them. In that case, their Lordships of the Supreme Court quashed the investigation as the first information report and the other materials did not disclose any offence.

(3.) IT has been laid down by the Supreme Court in Hareram Satpathy v. Tikaram Agrarwala and Ors. : A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1568, that as the Magistrate is restricted to finding out whether there is a prima facie case or not for proceeding against the accused and cannot enter into a detailed discussion of the merits or demerits of the, case and the scope of the revisional jurisdiction is very limited, the High Court cannot launch on a detailed and meticulous examination of the case on merits and set aside the order of the Magistrate directing issue of processes against certain persons. It would be useful to keep in mind the principles laid down in Chandra Deo Singh v. Prokash Chandra Bose alias Chabi Bose and Anr. : A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1430, Balraj Khana and Ors. v. Moti Ram, 1971 S.C.D. 822 and Nirmaljit Singh Hoon v. The State of West Bengal and Ors. : A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 2639. Whether there are sufficient materials to hold a person guilty of the charge levelled against him is to be decided at the stage of the trial and not at the stage of finding out as to whether sufficient materials are there to proceed against the person complained against. In this connection, reference may also be made to the observations made by this Court in the cases of Braiamohan Das v. Jogi Bisoi, 1982 C.L.R. (Cri) 203, Achuta and Ors. v. Smt. Bewa : 54 (1982) C.L.T. 369 and M.S. Jaggi v. Registrar, High Court of Orissa and Ors. : 54 (1982) C.L.T. 601.