KHYAMASILA ROUT Vs. KALANDI BEHERA AND ANR.

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE opposite party is the Appellant under Section 7(3) of the Orissa Development of Industries (land Acquisition) Act, 1948; 2 -22 acres of bhogra land were acquired. The total compensation fixed was Rs. 1339 -44 np. Before the learned Arbitrator both the parties claimed the entire amount. In the appeal, the Appellant has reduced his claim to half the amount. He claims to be the hereditary Ganju of village Tarkera in the ex -State of Gangpur, district Sundargarh: The objector was appointed the Sikkim Ganju of the village under Patta (ext. 3) and 50.21 acres of bhogra land including the disputed land were leased out to him in 1934 by the father of the Appellant. There was a previous litigation as to the title to the entire bhogra land. The matter was finally concluded in Second Appeal No. 288 of 1952 wherein this Court held that the objector acquired the title of a lessee in terms of ext. 3 by adverse possession. It is conceded by either side that the objector is the lessee and the opposite party is the lessor. The title of each party rests on the recitals of ext. 3, dated 30 -8 -1934. In accordance with its terms, the objector would remain in possession of the bhogra land. The only condition for forfeiture of the lease is that if the lessee failed to pay the Malgujari to the State according to the Kists through the lessor he would be liable to eviction from Sikkim Gountaiship and in respect of the bhogra land attached to it. The Arbitrator held - -

(2.) MR . Panda contends that the Arbitrator acted contrary to law in refusing to value the aforesaid right of reversion which vested in the lesser in the contingency of failure on the part of the lessee to pay the Malgujari to the State through him according to Kists. Mr. Sinha, on the other hand, contends that this right of reversion is a mere chance of the lease coming to an end by forfeiture and has no value and that the objector is entitled to the entire compensation. The contention raises an interesting question of law and requires close examination.

(3.) THE position of law seems to be concluded by the decision of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Sakariyawo v. Moriamo, A.I.R. 1930 P.C. 261, which has not been noticed in any of these cases. The decisions cited by Mr. Sinha do not lay down the proposition that the right of reversion cannot be valued. Each case depends on the evidence in that case. If, however, these decisions purport to lay down anything to the contrary, they must be treated as not laying down good law in view of the Privy Council dictum.