LAXMIDHAR ROUL Vs. DEBRAJ MOHANTY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The question referred to us for decision by the Division Bench reads as follows :

(2.) Though the reference before us arises out of a proceeding initiated under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, the question was argued from a larger perspective in view of the reference made to the Full Bench on a wider perspective. Strictly, in an application under the Contempt of Courts Act, the Court is not concerned with the correctness of the decision in respect of which the complaint is made, but whether the direction issued has not been complied with or has been wilfully disobeyed. In the case on hand, the question assumed a larger dimension in view of the fact that the decision rendered in the case was based on a statutory provision that had never been brought into force. In that context, apart from arguing that in view of the clear error committed by the Court in the judgment originally rendered, it was inexpedient to take proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act, learned Additional Government Advocate also argued thajt since the decision was patently erroneous in that it had proceeded on the basis of a non-existeijt statutory provision, it was just and proper for this Court, on being apprised of the mistake made, to suo motu correct that error and nothing could starfd in the way of this Court exercising such a power. Learned counsel for the petitioner sought to meet this contention by pointing out that even though there was no formal notification under Section 1(2) of Act 28 of 1991 bringing into force the relevant provisions, the Government had issued orders recognising the amended provisions and in that context, it could not be said that the decision was rendered on the basis of a non-existent provision and consequently was erroneous on the face of the record. The counsel also submitted that the correctness or otherwise of the decision had no relevance in considering whether there has been a wilful disobedience of the direction of this Court and no person charged with contempt could come forward with a plea that he was not obeying that direction since according to him the directing was erroneous. The counsel submitted that in this case, a petition for special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was filed against the judgment, but the same was dismissed by the Supreme Court, though of course it had to be conceded, that there was no merger of the decision of this Court in that of the decision of the Supreme Court since the order was one merely stating that the petition for special leave was dismissed.

(3.) Finding force in the submission of the learned Additional Government Advocate that there are a large number of .institutions governed by the Act and if a precedent of this Court which omitted to take note of the fact that the amended section had not been brought into force is allowed to stand, it will lead to great confusion, we feel that it would be appropriate for this Court to correct itself if it had made an error which was apparent on the face, of the record. Prima facie, it is seen that this Court has proceeded as if an amended provision had come into force, whereas it had in fact not and the difference between the two positions is so significant that we would be failing in our duty if we do not exercise our suo motu power to review the earlier judgment itself. In that perspective, we gave notice of our intention to consider the question of review to learned counsel for the petitioner and giving him time, adjourned the proceedings for hearing the entire matter and not merely the one referred to us for decision. Subsequently, counsel for the petitioner, counsel for the society and the Additional Government Advocate were heard not only on the question referred to us but also on the question posed in the writ petition filed by the petitioner and from the angle whether the judgment of this Court therein suffered from an error apparent on the face of the record which justified our reviewing that judgment itself. We thus reheard the whole matter.