(1.) BY this common judgment all the aforesaid Civil Revisions are considered relating to maintainability in view of the amendment of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short, 'the Code'), which came into force by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from Ist July, 2002. Before considering the legal issue, orders which are impugned in each of the revision petitions are briefly noted as follows :
(2.) IT appears from substance of the dispute in each of the above noted Civil Revisions that the interlocutory applications were disposed of in the impugned manner by the concerned Courts below. In view of the amendment of Section 115 of the Code, the prime question that emerges for consideration is as to whether such Civil Revisions are maintainable. In other words, whether this Court exercising the revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code should admjt and entertain such revisions in the event the impugned orders, if had been made in favour of the revision petitioners, i.e. the party applying for revision, would not have finally disposed of the suit or other proceedings.
(3.) SOME counsel appearing for some opposite party members however did not agree to the aforesaid argument advanced in support of maintainability of civil revisions against interlocutory orders. Their contention is that in view of the statutory provision in Section 115 of the Code, as it stands now, even if an order comes within the meaning of the term 'case decided' then also a revision application shall not be maintainable unless that qualifies to the requirement of law in the proviso to Sub section (1) of Section 115 of the Code, where it has been prescribed that 'except when the order, if it had been made in favour of the party applying for revision, would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceedings'. Some of such counsel also argued that decision of this Court in the case of M/s. Simplex Engineering (supra) relating to construing the meaning of the term 'other proceedings' appearing in the phrase 'suit or other proceedings' is not correct in view of the ratio in the case of Shri Vishnu Avatar etc. v. Sriram Avatar, AIR 1980 SC 1575, in which, with the help of the maxim 'ejusdem generis' their Lordships have excluded proceeding arising out of suits from the purview of the term 'other proceedings'. Therefore, according to them, a proceeding arising in or out of a sujt is not a proceeding within the meaning of the term 'other proceedings' used in Section 115 of the Code and in that respect the term 'other proceedings' means proceedings of original nature like Arbitration Proceeding, Proceeding under the Indian Succession Act, etc.