USHARANI ROUT AND ANR. Vs. SURENDRA PRADHAN @ ROUT

JUDGEMENT

(1.) MAINTAINABILITY of an application under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short 'the Code') in respect of an order passed by the District Judge, exercising power under the said section is the pivotal issue. Petitioners in this revision application have assailed correctness of the order passed by the learned District Judge, Cuttack. By the impugned order the prayer for revision of an order passed by the learned 2nd Additional Subordinate Judge, Cuttack refusing prayer for amendment was accepted.

(2.) MR . J. K. Mitra, learned counsel appearing for the opposite parties has raised a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the revision application under Section 115 of the Code. Mr.S.K. Nayak learned counsel appearing for petitioners has, however, submitted that there is no bar in entertaining an application for revision against the revisional order passed by the (earned District Judge; Reference in this context is made to Section 115(1) of the Code which authorises the High Court to call for the records of any case which has been decided by any Court subordinate to the High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto. According to Mr. Nayak, the language is wide enough to engulf a second revision before this Court. The submission though attractive cannot be accepted in view of what has been stated by the Supreme Court in Vishes Kumar v. Shanti Prasad : AIR 1980 SC 892

(3.) THE effect of amendment is that the High Court possesses exclusive jurisdiction under Section 115 in cases arising out of original suits of the value of Rs. 1,00,000/ - and above including such suits instituted before the commencement of the Amendment Act. The District Judge possesses exclusive jurisdiction under the said section in every other including a case arising out of an original suit instituted before such date; provided that in respect of all cases arising out original suits of any valuation decided by the District Judge, the High Court alone is competent to exercise revisional jurisdiction under Section 115. The controversy whether it is open to the High Court to exercise revisional power in respect of a revisional order under Section 115 of the District Court creates little difficulty as the basis for determining that question flows from the principle incorporated in the bifurcation of the revisional jurisdiction. The object behind bifurcation seems to divide the work load between the District Judge and the High Court. There is classification of the cases into two mutually exclusive categories depending on the valuation of the suits out of which they arise. If the legislative intent was classification of two mutually exclusive classes and categories, the very object and purpose shall be frustrated if a second revision against the revisional order passed by the District Judge is permitted. The construction of a provision should be such as to advance the object of legislation and suppress the mischief sought to be cured by it. If a revision petition is permitted to the High Court against the revisional order of the District Court, a fundamental contradiction would be allowed to invade and destroy the division of revisional power between the High Court and the District Court. My analysis has concurrence of the authoritative view of the Supreme Court in Vishes Kumar's case {supra). Therefore, I decline to entertain the revision application. No costs.