(1.) The petitioner entered into a contract with the Governor of Orissa on 4-12-1989 for supply of approximately 155 M. T. of iron fortified salt per month to be delivered at the district godowns of Koraput, Sundargarh and Phulbani. The period of the contract was 3 years to be counted from the date of execution of the agreement. What has led him to approach this Court is the direction contained in Annexure 7 dated 28-5-1991 issued by the Government to the District Social Welfare Officers of the concerned districts not to place any more requisition for iron fortified salt with the petitioner nor to accept delivery of any stock from 15-6-1991. The assertion of the petitioner is that this direction is against the mandate of the Constitution, and the principle of promissory estoppel would also not allow the Government to issue such a direction. It is, therefore, prayed to quash the same.
(2.) As the petitioner is seeking to enforce its contractual right through a writ of this Court, it has to be first seen whether the petition is maintainable in view of a number of decisions of the apex Court that no writ lies to enforce a right which is found purely on a contract. (See, inter alia, Lekhraj v. Dy. Custodian, AIR 1966 SC 334; Banchhanidhi v. State of Orissa, AIR 1972 SC 843; Harshankar v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, AIR 1975 SC 1121; and Divisional Forest Officer v. Biswanath Tea Co., AIR 1981 SC 1368).
(3.) Shri Rath has, however, referred to Divisional Forest Officer, South Kheri v. Ram Sanehi, AIR 1973 SC 205, and seeks to place reliance on the following observations finding place in paragraph 4 of the judgment:- "......We are unable to hold that merely because the source of the right which the respondent claims was initially in a contract, for obtaining relief against any arbitrary and unlawful action on the part of a public authority, he must resort to a suit and not to a petition by way of a writ. In view of the judgment of this Court in K. N. Guruswamy's case, (1955) 1 SCR 305 : AIR 1954 SC 592; there can be no doubt that the petition was maintainable, even if the right to relief arose out of an alleged breach of contract, where the action challenged was of a public authority invested with statutory power."