KHIROD ALIAS KHIRODRA DEBATA Vs. STATE OF ORISSA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Accused of offences punishable under Sections 402 and 477 A of the Indian Penal Code and aggrieved by the orders dated May 5, 1982, passed in three cases against hirn by the learned Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate, Bargarh, framing charges in respect of the two offences under Section 240 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code), the petitioner has corne up to this Court under Section 397 read with Section 401 and under Section 482 of the Code, in the three Revisions which, with the consent of the parties, have been heard together and will be governed by this common order, after deterrnining the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner that without proper application of rnind and perusing the materials and without affording a reasonable opportunity to the petitioner of being heard, the irnpugned orders have been passed mechanically without just and reasonable grounds. Mr. Nayak, the learned Additional Government Advocate, has raised the question of maintainability of the Revisions on the grounds that an order framing a charge against an accused person is an interlocutory order and, therefore, as provided in Section 397(2) of the Code, the Revisions are not cornpetent and in view of this statutory bar, the inherent powers of this Court under. Section 482 of the Code are not to be exercised and in support of his contention, reliance has been placed on the principles laid down in Amar Nath y. State of Haryana and others1, V.C. Shukla v. State through C.B.I.2, Jayaprakash v. State3, and N. B. Rarnarnoorthi, In Re4. Mr., Misra, appearing for the petitioner, has, however, placing reliance on a nurnber of decisions of the Supreme Court and of this Court including the case of Amar Nath v. State of Haryana and others (supra); Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra5, V. C. Shukla v. State through C.B.I. (supra) ; Lalit Mohan Mandal and others v. Benovendra Nath Chatterjee6, and Aditya Kumar Samal and others v. State7, submitted that the objections raised by the learned Additional Governrnent Advocate cannot prevail as the framing of a charge is an intermediate, if not a final order and not an interlocutory order within the meaning of Section 397(2) of the Code and even assurning that Section 397(2) is a bar to revise an order framing a charge, this Court, under Section 482 of the Code, can in fit and exceptional cases, exercise its powers and quash such orders passed by the learned Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate frarning charges with a direction to hear the rnatters afresh with reference to the documents on which the prosecution seeks reliance.

(2.) Prior to the coming into force of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, there was no statutory bar for revisions against orders framing charges. Section 397(2) of the Code provides: The powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding. The legislative intention in enacting the provision was not to limit the powers of the High Court sitting in revision and as a rnatter of fact, all the powers of the old Code have been retained subject to the exception provided in section 397(2) of the Code and this new provision was introduced ill order to prevent vexatious litigation by rnaking applications in revision against interlocutory orders passed by the Magistrate with a view to delaying the proceedings and harassing the adversaries. The term interlocutory has not been defined in the Code and after the new Code carne into force, this has becorne a subject of controversy. What is an interlocutory order and what is a final order have been interpreted in a number of cases of this Court and now the controversy has been set at rest by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Madhu Lirnaye v. State of Maharashtra (supra).

(3.) Before any authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court relating to this controversial question was made for the guidance of the Courts, a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Bhima Naik and nine others v. State8, observed that judicial pronouncement on Articles 133 and 134 of the Constitution of India and on Sections 109 and 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure would point out the distinction between final and interlocutory orders and would render substantial assistance in defining the meaning of interlocutory order in Section 397(2) of the Code. Reference was made to the case of S. Kuppuswami Rao v. The King9, and it was observed that the meaning of interlocutory order was the same as in both civil and criminal proceedings. In this connection, a reference was also made to the cases of Mohammed Amin Brothers Ltd. and others v. The Dominion of India and others10, Firm Ram Chand Majimal and others v. Firm Goverdhandas Vishandas Tatanchand and others11, Abdul Rahaman v. Cassim and Sons12, Prem Chand v. State of Bihar13, State of U. P. v. Col. Sujau Singh and others14, Mohanlal Maganlal Thakur v. State of Gujarat,15 Suleman v. Warner,16 MIs. Tarapore and Co. Madras v. MIs. yb. Tractors Export, Moscow and another17, The United Provinces Electric Supply Co. Ltd. V. Chatterjee and others18, and Saryadhavan Ghosal and others v. Smt. Deorajin Debi and another19, and it was ultimately held that the order caning upon the petitioner to execute interim bonds did not pm an end to the main proceeding under Section 107 or the Code though the impugned order purported to decide a vital issue as to the execution of interim bonds and it did not terminate the proceeding.