STATE OF ORISSA Vs. MINAKETAN PATNAIK

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is as application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against the judgment of this Court in Government Appeal No. 3 of 1951.* One Sri Minaketan Patnaik, Civil Supplies Officer, Belangir, was prosecuted for having committed an offence under Section 161, Penal Code, by accepting a sum of Rs. 200/ - as illegal gratification from one Purushotlam who was examined as P. W. I. The trial court disbelieved the oral evidence given in support of the prosecution case and acquitted the accused. As against that acquittal, the State Govt. filed an appeal to this Court. It was heard by my learned brothers, Panigrahi and Narasimham, JJ. Ultimately, the appeal was dismissed by this Court. It is against that dismissal that this application for leave to appeal is made by the State.

(2.) THE case for the prosecution very shortly stated was as follows: P. W. 1 is the purchasing agent of the firm of Shivashankar Tricumjee. The accused on two occasions, once on 25 -1 -1950, and again on 12 -2 -1950, demanded a bribe from P. W. 1 in order that he may use his official position to facilitate certain exports of Kudo from Kantabanji railway station, for the benefit of P. W. 1 and his principal. It is further the case of the prosecution that a few days after 12 -2 -1950, the principal of P. W. 1; viz., P. W. 4, was informed about it and thereafter, on information given by him to the Police, a trap was laid for the detection of the same. In pursuance of this trap, P. W. 1, accompanied by another person P. W. 3, went to the residence of the accused on 5 -3 -1950. with marked currency notes of Rs. 200/ - which were handed over by P. W. 1 to the accused. Within half an hour and in accordance with the prearranged plan, the District Magistrate with the C. I. D. Inspector, and another neighbour of the accused, proceeded to the house of the accused and seized the marked notes from the, accused. It will be seen from the above narration that the case against the accused depends on proof of the two previous alleged demands as well as of the actual offer and acceptance of the bribe in pursuance of those demands. The evidence of the earlier demands is that of P. W. 1, corroborated by that of P. W. 4, who speaks to P. W. 1 having conveyed informations to him as to the demands. The evidence of the actual offer and acceptance is that of P. W. 1 and P. W. 3. The evidence of the fact that the offer itself was the outcome of a planned trap is that of the C. I. D. Inspector examined as P. W. 8. On an appreciation of the evidence of these witnesses, the trying Magistrate was not prepared to accept the same and acquitted the accused. A perusal of the judgments of my learned brothers, shows that Panigrahi J. agreed with the trial court and rejected the evidence as unreliable, while Narasimham J. was inclined to hold that the prosecution case has been sufficiently made out on the evidence of these witnesses. But though thus inclined he did not wish to express dissent from the order of dismissal of the appeal which was passed by the ether Judge, Panigrahi J. and accordingly agreed thereto.

(3.) IT is next contended that the decision in the case raises a substantial and important question of law and that therefore leave should be granted under Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution, which provides for an appeal to the Supreme Court, if the High Court certifies that the case is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court. In support of this argument, it is pointed out that the question of law raised in this case is whether or not decoy witnesses for bribery and corruption, are to be treated as accomplices whose evidence requires corroboration. It is further stated that there is some difference of view in High Courts as regards this question and that neither the Privy Council nor the Federal Court, nor the Supreme Court have so far given any direct decision on the question. At this stage, I must state that when this application for leave to appeal came up in the first instance before the Division Bench consisting of myself and my learned brother Narasimham J. I was inclined to take the view that even if such a question did arise on this case, that would not be a sufficient ground for permitting a further appeal to the Supreme Court by the State as against the acquittal of an accused confirmed by the High Court, My learned brother was inclined to think that that would not be a legitimate consideration and that the question of law raised was one of sufficient importance and that leave may Be granted under Article 134(1)(c). of the Constitution. We accordingly thought it desirable to hear this application as a Special Bench of three Judges, including the other learned Judge who was a party to the disposal of the appeal.