NARSING DAS HIRALAL LTD Vs. BISANDAYAL SATYANARAIN FIRM

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS revision petition is against the appellate judgment of the Additional District Judge of Cuttack reversing the judgment of the First Additional Sub-Judge of Cuttack and setting aside an award given by the arbitrators and the judgment and decree following the award.

(2.) THE opposite party was the defendant in Suit No. 57/8 of 1949-48 in the Court of the 1st Additional Sub-Judge, Cuttack. That suit was brought under Sections 14 and 17, Indian Arbitration Act, 1940 by the petitioners-plaintiffs for a judgment in terms of an award said tr have been given by the arbitrators appointed by the parties, on 13-12-47. THE plaintiffs and the defendant executed separate arbitration agreements (ekrarnamas) dated 13-3-47 and 11-3-47 respectively referring their dispute to three respectable merchants of Cuttack, namely, Rangalal Modi, Narsingdas Bhowsinka and Joharimal. In the arbitration agreements executed by the parties no time limit was fixed for the giving of the award and consequently the provisions of para 3 of the First Schedule to the Arbitration Act would apply and the award should be made within four months after the arbitrators have entered on the reference. As already stated, the award was given only on 13-12-47 in which it was stated that a sum of Rs. 3898/8/- was due from the defendant to the plaintiffs.

(3.) IF, however, the Court refuses to extend the time limit there may be some justification for holding that the arbitrators are guilty of legal misconduct in making the award after the expiry of the statutory period and the award may be liable to be set aside. Mr. B. N. Das relied on -- 'Kuppuswami Chetty v. Anantharamier', AIR 1948 Mad 40 (G); -- 'I. G. H Ariff v. Bengal Silk Mills Ltd.', AIR 1949 Cal 350 (H) and -- 'Abdul Hakim Khan v. Lahore Improvement Trust', AIR 1950 Lah 32 (I)'. But these decisions are clearly distinguishable because in none of them did the Court concerned exercise its discretionary power under Subsection (1) of Section 28 to extend the time limit. Those decisions, therefore, have no application to the present case where the trial Court has stated in its judgment that in the interests of equity it considers it proper to allow the period to be extended beyond four months.