LAWS(ORI)-1991-6-18

K NARAYAN PATRA Vs. GOPINATH SAHU

Decided On June 18, 1991
K.NARAYAN PATRA Appellant
V/S
GOPINATH SAHU Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Since a common point relating to propriety of orders passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Banpur dispensing with personal attendance of opp. party accused u/S. 205 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the 'Code') is involved, both cases are taken up together and this judgment will govern them. Fact situation is almost identical in both the cases.

(2.) In Criminal Revision No. 170 of 1989 order dated 21-1-1989 in I.CC Case No. 27 of 1988 is impugned; whereas in Criminal Revision No. 501 of 1989 order dated 12-6-1989 in I.CC Case No. 46 of 1988 is impugned. Both the cases were instituted on the basis of complaint filed by present petitioner. Cognizance u/S. 420/294 of the Indian Penal Code (in short the 'IPC') in the former, and u/S. 379, IPC in the latter case has been taken. On receipt of summons, accused-opposite party prayed for dispensing with his personal attendance and to permit appearance by his pleader. It was inter alia stated in the applications that he is Manager of a Nationalised Bank, and was required to be present in office for transacting various banking activities in such capacity and was required to attend to several time bound programs of the Government. in the matter of extending facilities to applicants for financial assistance. The reasons found favour with the learned Magistrate, and while dispensing with personal attendance, accused-opposite party was permitted to be represented by his Advocate. In both the cases similar orders were passed, which have been assailed.

(3.) Main plank of argument of learned counsel for petitioner is that accused would not have been prejudiced had he personally appeared in court and, therefore, learned Magistrate was not justified in dispensing with his personal attendance. Learned counsel for opp. party, however, submits that power u/S. 205 of the Code has been judicially exercised and there being no perversity in the orders impugned, there is no scope for interference while exercising revisional jurisdiction.