RABINDRANATH ROUT Vs. STATE OF ORISSA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These ten cases seeking quashing of the criminal proceedings initiated against the petitioner arise out of the common set of facts and hence are disposed of by this common judgment. During the period 1966 to 1976 the petitioner was functioning as the Accountant in East Coast Salt and Chemical Industries Ltd. In 1976 he was promoted as the Assistant Accounts Officer.In the year 1978 certain financial irregularities were detected having been committed by him and he was called upon to make good the loss to the extent of Rs. 60,000/- . Such amount was deposited in two instalments on 12-1-1979 and 25-1-1979 respectively, and on 28-3-1980 he was dismissed from service. Thereafter in the year 1983 a complaint case was filed against the petitioner by the management of the company, numbered as I.C.C. Case No. 114 of 1983 in the court of the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Bhubaneswar, alleging commission of offences punishable u/Ss. 409,467, 471 and 477, IPC. The complaint was forwarded by the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate to the Officer-in-charge, Capital Police Station for investigation. Thereupon the Capital Police Station Case No. 679 of 1983 was registered on 2-9-1983. On 30-6-1986 the Investigating Officer drew up nine more FIRs and submitted chargesheets on 10-7-1986 in all the ten cases. The charges were framed on 2-6-1988 u/Ss. 409, 467, 471 and 477-A, IPC in all the cases. It is the submission of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that since the alleged offences against the petitioner relate to the period from 1968 to 1978 and that periods ranging from 12 to 23 years have elapsed in the meantime and the trial has not commenced, such prosecution of criminal 1cases against him is violative of Art. 21 of the Constitution of India and hence the prosecutions have become liable to he quashed on account of inordinate delay.

(2.) That speedy trial is a fundamental right of an accused is no longer res integra the question having been conclusively decided in AIR 1979 SC 1360 : (1979 Cri LJ 1036) Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary and AIR 1981 SC 939 : (1981 Cri LJ 481) Khadra Pehadiya v. State of Bihar. A man placed under a criminal proceeding lives under an apprehension of conviction every moment and by a protracted and unresponsive trial the agony of the person concerned is unduly stretched which is incompatible with the fundamental right to life which concept takes in itself the right to live with human dignity. That being so, it must beheld that a criminal prosecution must be pursued with expedition as otherwise a protracted trial becomes oppressive and often results in undue harassment to the accused. In AIR 1986 SC 289 : (1986 Cri LJ 255) S. Guin v. Grindlays Bank Ltd., where the accused persons were prosecuted u/S.341, IPC and S. 36AD of the Banking Regulation Act but were acquitted by the trial court and the judgment of acquittal was set aside by the High Court remanding the case for retrial u/S. 341 read with S. 34 or S. 149, IPC, and as against that an appeal was presented to the Supreme Court, the Apex Court, in consideration of the fact that the appeal had remained pending for six years in the High Court, directed that retrial should not have been ordered even though it was found that the acquittal, was improper. In AIR 1987 SC 740 Rakesh Saxena v. State through C.B.1. the Supreme Court again quashed the prosecution where the offence was alleged to have been committed six years back as it was felt that in view of the complicated nature of the case the trial is bound to occupy the time of the trial court for not less than two or three years and it is extremely doubtful as to whether the prosecution will result in conviction. In AIR 1989 SC 1789: (1989 Cri LJ 2106) State of Madhya Pradesh v. Narayan Singh where the accused had been charged under Fertilisers (Movement Control) Order, 1973 and were convicted for the first time in the Supreme Court, the Court declined to pass any order of punishment as more than fifteen years had gone by since the persons concerned had been acquitted by the trial court.

(3.) A prosecution u/S. 409, IPC was quashed by a decision of this Court in 1987 (1) OLR 119 : (1987 Cri LJ 2022) K. Achuta Rao v. State of Orissa where the period of offence was from 29-4-1970 to 1972, the cognizance was taken on 3-9-1984 and the charge has been framed thereafter on 21-1-1986. Such a view was also taken by me in 1988 (11) OLR 350 Rajib Lochan Behari v. State of Orissa where inview of the fact that although eleven years had elapsed, absolutely no progress had been made by the investigating agency and no chargesheet had been filed. It was observed that criminal prosecutions are designed to achieve social justice, but are not meant for being utilised for oppression and harassment which undoubtedly results in prolonging the investigation and keeping the accused on tenterhook throughout in apprehension of trial. In an unreported decision, Criminal Misc. Case No. 15 of 1990 Ghanashyam Mohanty v. State of Orissa referring to various decisions of the Supreme Court as well as of this Court conclusion was reached that delay in trial by itself constitutes denial of justice and violates the constitutional guarantee of speedy trial. While this has been the general trend of judicial pronouncements, yet a word of caution was administered in AIR 1990 SC 1266 : (1990 Cri LJ 1306) State of Andhra Pradesh v. P. V. Pavithran. It was held that there is no denying the fact that a letharagic and lackadaisical manner of investigation over a prolonged period makes an accused in a criminal proceeding live every moment under extreme emotional and mental stress and strain and to remain always under a fear psychosis. Therefore, it is imperative that if investigation of a criminal proceeding, staggers on with tardy pace due to the indolence or inefficiency of the investigating agency causing unreasonable and substantial delay resulting in grave prejudice or disadvantage to the accused, the Court as the protector of the right and personal liberty of the citizen will step in and resort to the drastic remedy of quashing further proceedings in such investigation. Even so, there are offences of grave magnitude such as diabolical crimes of conspiracy or clandestine crimes committed by members of the underworld with their tentacles spread over various parts of the country or even abroad. The very nature of such offences would necessarily involve considerable time for unearthing the crimes and bringing the culprits to book. It was hence held that it is not possible to formulate inflexible guidelines or rigid principles of uniform application for speedy investigation or to stipulate any arbitrary period of limitation within which investigation in a criminal case should be completed and the determination on the question whether the accused has been deprived of fair trial on account of delayed or protracted investigation would also therefore, depend on various factors including whether such delay was unreasonably long or caused deliberately or intentionally to hamper the defence of the accused or whether such delay was inevitable in the nature of things or whether it was due to the dilatory tactics adopted by the accused. The Court, in addition, has to consider whether such delay on the part of the investigating agency has caused grave prejudice or disadvantage to the accused. Applying such principles to the facts of the present case, it is seen, as has been submitted by Mr. Mund, that period ranging from 12 to 23 years had elapsed after the alleged acts of commission of the offence. The very first complaint was filed by the management long three years after the dismissal of the petitioner from service. The investigation itself took the period from 1983 to 1986 and even though chargesheet was submitted on 10-7-1986 yet charges were framed only on 2-6-1988. Even though notice had been issued for admission and final disposal, yet no case is made out by the State of any part of delay to have been contributed by the accused nor any explanation is coming forward as to why such delay has occurred. No attempt was also made to justify the delay except the bare statement of the offence being of a heinous nature and that defalcation of large amounts is involved. Such facts by itself would not be sufficient to stiffle the fundamental right of the petitioner. Considering such facts, it becomes apparent that the petitioner in act has been denied a fair trial and that continuance of the proceedings would result more in harassment to him. The results of the prosecutions after such length of time are also in grave doubt. In that view of the matter, I do not think that any useful purpose would be served to continue the prosecutions and hence the prosecutions in these cases are quashed.