VYSYARAJU BADARINARAYANA MOORTY RAJU Vs. STATE OF ORISSA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeks to assail the order passed by the authority specified under Section 18-B of the Orissa Money Lenders Act, 1939 (opposite party No. 3.) as affirmed in appeal by the authority specified under sub-section (6) thereof (opposite party No. 2).

(2.) Petitioner is a registered moneylender under the provisions of the Orissa Money Lenders Act (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') carrying on business in Berhampur area within the district of Ganjam and in his certificate of registration bearing No. 40 of 1973, the, amount specified was Rs. 13,25,000/-. The original Act underwent an amendment and by Orissa Act 54 of 1975. Section 18-B was inserted into the statute. As far as relevant that section provided:

(3.) The main question that has been canvassed before us is whether the specified authority has power to condone delay by extending the limitation when moved under Section 5 of the Limitation Act of 1963. Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act is relied upon in support of the submission. That subsection provides :" Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Section 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law." Indisputably the provision of sub-section (2) of Section 29 is different from the corresponding provision of the earlier Act of 1908. The new Act extends the application of provisions of Secs. 4 to 24 unless there be exclusion in the special Act while the old Act required specified provision to make these sections applicable to the special Act. Mr. Mohanty for the petitioner contends that by virtue of Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act of 1963, Section 5 is applicable to a case of this type and when power under that section had been asked to be exercised, the authority under the statute should have examined to find out whether a case for extending time had been made out. But under a mistaken impression that the provision has no application, the specified authority has refused to exercise jurisdiction duly vested in him under the law. It is contended that the appellate authority fell into the same error while concurring with the specified authority. Mr. Mohanty does not contend that the specified authority is a 'court', but relies on a Bench decision of this Court in the case of Raghunath Agarwalla v. State of Orissa, (1975) 41 Cut LT 297 : (1975 Tax LR 2075), where this Court has taken the view that though the Tribunal under the Orissa Sales Tax Act was not a court, yet in view of the language of S.29 (2) of the Limitation Act, the provisions of S.5 thereof would be attracted. Learned Additional Government Advocate, on the other hand, has contended that the Limitation Act applies to courts only and unless by statutory provision, the provisions of the Limitation Act would be extended to quasi-judicial authorities not being courts, the provisions of the Limitation Act cannot be applied on the basis of S.29 (2) thereof. Series of authorities have been cited before us by counsel for both sides in support of their respective propositions. Sub-section (1) of S.18-B of the Act vests the State Government with power to notify the date within which the records relating to the business including documents evidencing advance of loans are to be produced before the specified authority. The section does not at all envisage any application to be filed. The only step contemplated by sub-section (1) is that the money-lender shall produce before the specified authority all the records relating to the business including documents evidencing advance of loans. The requirement under sub-section (1) of S.18-B not being in relation to filing of suits, appeals or applications, sub-section (2) of S.29 of the Limitation Act does not cover a case of this type. It is not Mr. Mohanty's case that whenever any action not being filing of a suit, appeal or application, is required by any statute to be done, the aid of S.5 of the Limitation Act can be invoked through the mechanism provided under S.29 (2) of the Limitation Act. We are, therefore, inclined to think that sub-section (2) of S.29 does not cover a case of this type. Undoubtedly, the amendment which brought in S.18-B into the statute was inserted into the Act with a view to introducing further regulations on the money-lender. This was a beneficial legislation for the loanees and with a view to doing it the Amending Act brought in welfare provision. The legislative intention being regulation and the period to be fixed for compliance having been statutorily authorised, we think that a clear direction to comply within the date fixed and thus by implication to exclude the scope for extension of time had really been intended. This view is supported by the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Raja Pande v. Sheopujan Pande, AIR 1942 All 429, and the Supreme Court in the case of Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra. AIR 1974 SC 480 has upheld this view. We are, therefore, inclined to think that to the facts of the present case the principle indicated by the Division Bench of this Court in the sales tax matter in (1975) 41 Cut LT 297 : (1975 Tax LR 2075) (supra) would have no application for the reasons indicated above and petitioner's contention that the specified authority had jurisdiction to extend the time must be repelled. We accordingly reject the argument of Mr. Mohanty for the petitioner that the authorities under the Act had illegally refused to exercise jurisdiction vested in them under the law. In view of the admitted position that accounts had not been produced before the specified authority for the period beyond November, 1975, the petitioner is not entitled to the relief for the same up to the date of the second notification.