RAMNARAYAN SINGH Vs. KUBERA SAHU

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE plaintiff has brought this second appeal against the reversing judgment of the lower appellate Court arising out of a suit for declaration of title and for recovery of possession. The plaintiff is the recorded tenant in respect of Khata No. 13 and the disputed land appertains to plot No. 1156 with an area of Order 12 of the said khata of the village Kandajuri. The allegation of the plaintiff is that the defendant constructed a house on the disputed land on 7th May 1943 which serves as the cause of action for the suit for ejectment. The relevant point for discussion before us is the point of limitation. The suit was filed on 19th December 1956. Indeed the suit is barred under Article 144 of the Indian Limitation Act. B the relevant facts necessary to bring the point are as follows: on 18th April 1945 the plaintiff filed his case in the Revenue Court under the provisions of Section 85 of the Patna State Tenancy Act, 1944. The matter was heard; but the Sub-divisional officer passed an order on the 1st December 1955 to the effect that the matter was to be decided in the Civil Court on account of which the suit was filed on 19th December 1956. The plaintiff claims for on exclusion of the time taken by the proceedings before the Revenue Court relying upon the provisions of section 14 of the Limitation Act in order to save limitation of the present suit.

(2.) THE position is clear and is accepted by both the parties that if this period taken in the proceedings before the Revenue Court is excluded, the suit is within time otherwise the plaintiff has got to be non-suited as being hit by the mischief of the point of limitation. The only question for determination is whether the case can be covered by Section 14 of the Limitation Act which runs as follows;

(3.) THE main points of dispute as to the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation act are whether the Revenue Officer before whom the proceedings were started can the taken to be a Court as contemplated under Section 14 of the Limitation act, and further whether proceedings before him can be termed as ''civil proceedings" as used in Section 14. On the first question, as to whether the Sub-divisional Officer, who had passed the order and who had indeed the power to take cognizance of the petition, can be termed to be a court or purely au administrative officer passing the order in the discharge of his administrative function, or even as quasi Judicial Tribunal. The 8 sections of the Patna State Tenancy Act are relevant for our purpose. They are Sections 85, 94 and 99. Section 85 runs as follows: