KHALLI RATH Vs. EPPILI RAMACHANDRA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal arises out of execution proceedings started by me decree-holder (respondent) for delivery of possession of a house. The appellant was the defendant on a suit brought by the respondent for eviction from a house belonging to the latter and for recovery of arrears of rent. On 21-3-46 the parties filed a deed of compromises whereby it was agreed between them that the appellant would pay rent at the rate of Rs. 5/- per month for one year, namely till 31-3-47, as tenant, and at the end of the year he would vacate the house without notice. On that very same day, viz., 21-3-46 a decree was passed in terms of the above compromise. The appellant, however, did not vacate the house, as stipulated and the respondent started execution on 17-547. In the meanwhile the Orissa House Rent Control Act had been extended to the town of Russelkonda, where the suit house is situated, it is urged on behalf of the appellant that he is not liable to eviction, firstly, on a plain reading of the terms of the compromise, the decree is inexecutable and secondly for want of a certificate from the Collector under the provisions of the House Rent Control Act.

(2.) The Courts below have held that the compromise decree is executable as the suit itself was for possession. It appears to us that it would be travelling beyond the words used by the parties in the compromise deed, to import into it anything like a provision directing execution to be taken in the event of the defendant not vacating the house after the expiry of the period of one year. The compromise does not say that the decree-holder shall be entitled to enforce the compromise in execution proceedings and eject the defendant. Nor does it say that the defendant should deliver back possession at the end of the stipulated period. All that the stipulation amounts to is that the defendant agreed to vacate after a certain date. What would happen in the event of a violation of this provision was not stipulated or agreed to between the parties. In such circumstances it is difficult to hold that the parties intended that the plaintiff should recover possession by way of execution as the suit itself was one for possession. We are therefore unable to accept the view taken by the Courts below that the decree was executable as the suit itself was for possession and would set aside the order under appeal.

(3.) The second objection taken by the judgment-debtor is equally well founded. It clear to us that the Orissa House Rent Control Act was in operation in Russelkonda (SIC) when execution was started. It is adverted that the requirements of that Act have been complied with by the decree-holder, (SIC) the obtaining of a certificate from the controller. Mr. P.V.B. Rao appearing for the decree-holder concedes that a certificate should have been obtained from the Controller before the decree-holder could execute the decree.