AJIT NARAYAN BHANJA DEO Vs. UNION OF INDIA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner has approached this Court with the following prayer:

(2.) The short facts of the petitioner's case is that he was appointed as a 'badli' substitute sub-staff in the office of the Branch Manager, National Insurance Company Ltd. (opposite party No. 2) at Baripada on August 13, 1978 and continued till May 19, 1984 when he was illegally denied and prevented from doing his assigned work. According to the petitioner he was neither dismissed nor terminated from service, but illegally prevented from doing work. His representation and personal approach to the authorities yielded no result. However, with the hope of getting re-employment he waited and at last opposite party No. 2 issued letter No. 153000/PRSIDJ dated October 16, 1990 in a certificate form, a copy of which is Armexure-1. It is averred that when he was appointed in 1978 he was not issued with any letter of appointment nor any letter was issued when he was prevented to discharge his duties on and from September 10, 1990 and, therefore, only when he obtained a written letter (Annexure-1) he raised an Industrial Dispute. A Conciliation proceeding was started before the Assistant Labour Commissioner (Central), Rourkela which was completed on April 29, 1992. As the petitioner had not received a copy of the failure of conciliation report which was sent by the Conciliation Officer to the opposite party No. 1, the petitioner sent a letter on August 3, 1990 to the Conciliation Officer to issue a copy thereof pursuant to which the Conciliation Officer issued the letter dated August 5, 1992 (Annexure-3). The petitioner made representation to opposite party No. 1 to refer the matter for adjudication by the Labour Court/Tribunal under Section 12(5) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Nothing having happened the petitioner approached this Court in O.J.C. No. 9538 of 1993 which was disposed of by order dated March 3, 1994 directing the opposite party No. 1 to take decision on the failure report within two months from the date of receipt of the order. Subsequently Misc. Case and Contempt cases were filed, and ultimately in Original Criminal Misc. Case No. 348 of 1995 filed by the petitioner this Court found from the materials on record that the Ministry declined to refer the dispute for adjudication vide letter dated July 3, 1992 on the ground that the dispute had been raised belatedly. The order was communicated to the petitioner. This Court observed that in view of the fact that decision has already been taken on the failure report of the Conciliation Officer declining to make a reference for adjudication no further action was warranted. The petitioner has not filed the certified copies of the order passed in Original Criminal Misc. Case No. 348 of 1995, but has quoted some portions thereof. According to the petitioner he got the copy of the order dated July 3, 1992/August 11, 1994 of opposite party No. 1 through the Senior Standing counsel from which he could come to know that the opposite party No. 1 had declined to refer the matter for adjudication since the dispute had been raised belatedly. It is contended that since the petitioner received the aforesaid communication only on June 20, 1996 he has challenged the said order in the present writ application.

(3.) The opposite parties 1 and 2 have not filed any return, but opposite party No. 3 only has filed a return. It is the stand of this opposite party that the petitioner was never appointed, but he was intermittently engaged casually when regular sub-staff remained absent or there was a casual increase of work load in the Branch in which a sub-staff is required to attend to. Such casual engagements are dependant upon immediate availability of persons in the vicinity or conveniently whenever such contigency arises. No interview is made nor any requisition to the Employment Exchange is done for such types of appointments because of uncertainty of requirements. Sometimes more than one of such 'badlis' or 'substitutes' are engaged depending upon contingencies. The petitioner worked casually for two days during December, 1978 at the first instance and till April 19, 1984 he had worked intermittently for some days and the total number of days of such engagement of the petitioner since December, 1978 and not from September 13, 1978 as wrongly alleged to May, 1984 was for 126 days only. The allegation of the petitioner that he was refused work has been stoutly denied in the aforesaid circumstances.