MIHIR RAY Vs. THE SECOND LAND ACQUISITION COLLECTOR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal has been preferred against the judgment and/or order passed by a learned Judge of this Court on 14th Dec., 1998 in Matter No. 352 of 1982. By the said order, the writ application was rejected in which the writ petitioner had challenged the acquisition proceeding being L.A. Case No. 1-D of 1981/82 including the notification under Sec. 4 and declaration under Sec. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") and the notice under Sec. 9 of the Act and the two other notices dated 8th April, 1992 on the ground that the acquisition proceeding was mala fide and made in colorable exercise of power conferred upon the Land Acquisition Collector and that there was no public purpose for which the premises No. 8/2, Gariahat Road including the land was sought to be acquired and also on the ground of delay in disposal of such proceeding. Before we take up the respective submissions of the learned Counsel for the parties, we may state briefly the facts leading to the filing of this appeal which are as follows :

(2.) We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties. We have also carefully examined the judgment under appeal and also materials on record. After considering the respective submissions of the learned Counsel for the parties and after examining the materials on record including the judgment under appeal, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances of this case, in learned Trial Judge was fully justified in discharging the rule by holding that the proceeding initiated for acquisition of the property was taken in accordance with law.

(3.) Before us, Mr. Saktinath Mukherjee, appearing on behalf of the writ petitioner/appellant contended that since there existed no explanation at all for long delay to finalise the proceeding and concretize the alleged public purpose, the Court must invariably conclude that no public purpose existed or was in sight which could be put in practical shape and, therefore, it must be held that there was ample ground for the Court to hold that the State Government had exercised power which was colorable and accordingly, the entire proceeding for acquisition under the Act must be held to be bad, arbitrary and without jurisdiction. Mr. Mukherjee further contended that the valuation of the property could be arrived at on the basis of the date of notification under Sec. 4 of the Act and the writ petitioner/appellant by such long delay would be denied a statutory right to get the market price of property as the valuation of the same would be obviously pegged down to their disadvantage and, therefore, in view of the above, the entire proceeding for acquisition of the property must be struck down by the Court. In support of this contention, Mr. Mukherjee relied on three decisions which are reported in 1994 (l) SCC 44 (Ramchand Vs. Union of India) , AIR 1982 Punjab and Haryana 519 (Radheshyan Vs. State of Haryana ), and AIR 1981 Gujarat 67 (Shankerbhai Mahijibhai Vs. State). There is no quarrel about the principles laid down in the aforesaid three decisions. In our view, the facts disclosed herein above would safely indicate that the delay in taking steps in the acquisition proceeding must be condoned in view of various steps and actions taken by the authorities in the matter. In the case of State of U.P. Vs. Smt. Tista Devi and Ors., AIR 1986 Supreme Court 2025 , it has been held by the Apex Court of our country that the post notification delay was not by itself sufficient to render the acquisition proceeding invalid. That is to say, mere delay, if the same is properly explained, cannot vitiate the acquisition proceeding. From the facts stated herein earlier, we are of the view that the facts involved in the present case would invite us to hold that there was no delay in taking steps in the acquisition proceeding and even if there was some delay that should be condoned in the facts and circumstances of this case. Let us, therefore, deal with the facts involved from Sept., 1975 when Sec. 6 notification was issued and when the notice under Sec. 9 of the Act was served on the writ petitioner/appellant that is in the month of March, 1982. If this delay of about 7 years can be said to have been properly explained by the State authorities, in that case, the acquisition proceeding cannot be struck down on the ground of delay. There is no dispute that the original notification was issued in respect of two properties one of which was released from acquisition subsequently. Since one of the properties was released from acquisition that is 1A, Rustomji Street, Calcutta, no alternative was left to the State Government but to amend the notification issued under Sec. 4 of the Act. In the month of Feb., 1976, the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act came into force. At that stage, it was uncertain what would be the effect of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act on. properties under acquisition. For that uncertainty, the State Government directed all land acquisition proceedings to be stayed until such uncertainity was cleared. The said uncertainity was eventually referred to the Government of India. Clearance was received by the State Government from the Central Government in Aug., 1977. Subsequently, step under Sec. 7 of the Act was taken by which the Collector was to take order for acquisition. The measurement and plan making of the land had to be taken under Sec. 8 of the Act. A revised order under Sec. 7 of the Act was necessitated to be passed because of the decision of the Government about non applicability of the Land Ceiling Act. Thereafter, the Path Bhavan Authorities was asked to put in the funds after preparation and approval of estimated cost. The School authorities did not have the fund needed at that time and also asked the State Government to acquire the property under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act finally. In the month of Jan., 1982, the Path Bhavan Authorities decided to proceed with the acquisition proceeding. In the month of March, 1982, the required notice was served on the writ petitioner/appellant. From the facts stated above, we are of the view that the delay in proceeding with the acquisition proceeding for the period from Sept., 1975 and March, 1982 was fully explained and accordingly delay in taking steps to finalise the acquisition proceeding must be condoned. In Gujarat State Transport Corporation Vs. Valji, Mulji, Soneji and Ors., AIR 1980 Supreme Court 64, the Supreme Court held in the facts and circumstances of that case that the delay occasioned was not un-reasonable, although delay was more than 15 years between the notification under Sec. 4 and the declaration under Sec. 6 of the Act. Before parting with the question of delay, we must deal with the decisions cited at the bar on behalf of the writ petitioner/appellant in support of the contention that as there was inordinate delay in issuing the notice under Section.9 of the Act from the date of declaration under Sec. 6 of the Act, the acquisition proceeding must be struck down. Let us first deal with the decision in the case of Ramchand Vs. Union of India, 1994 (1) SCC 44. In that decision, the Supreme Court found on the available materials from the record that there was no explanation except that there was several cases and as such in normal course, the Supreme Court held that there was bound to be delay in making the awards. It is true that in that decision the explanation for delay was not accepted by the Supreme Court, but at the same time, the acquisition of the acquired property of the said decision was not struck down only a direction was made for payment of additional amount of compensation which should be made in terms of Aflatton' s case (1975) 4 SCC 285. In view of our findings made herein above that the materials on record would show that the explanation given by the respondents on the question of delay from the date of issue the notice under Sec. 9 of the Act and the date of declaration under Sec. 6 must be accepted and, therefore, in our view, this decision of the Supreme Court is clearly distinguishable on facts. Next we deal with the decision of the Full Bench of the Punjab High Court in the case of Radheshyam Vs. State of Haryana, AIR 1982 Punjab and Haryana 519. The principles laid down in the said decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court cannot be disputed. It is true that delays between notification under Sec. 6 and notice under Sec. 9 are to be viewed in the overall context from the initiation of the proceedings and not from the narrow terminus merely of the date with Sec. 6 notification. It is well settled that each case depends on its facts. In view of our conclusion made herein before that the delay in issuing the notice under Sec. 9 of the Act from the date of declaration under Sec. 6 of the Act has been explained sufficiently by the State respondents, we do not think that in the facts and circumstances of this case, the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court can lead us to hold that the entire acquisition proceeding must be quashed and or struck down on the ground of delay. Next we consider the decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Shankerbhai Mahijibhai Vs. State, AIR 1981 Gujarat 67 . Again this case is distinguishable from the facts involved in the present case. In that decision also a Division Bench of Gujarat High Court has struck down the acquisition proceeding on the ground of delay. In paragraph 24 of the said decision, the Division Bench gave their reasons for striking out the acquisition proceeding which, in our view, should be quoted, paragraph 24 runs as follows :