AJOY KUMAR SARKAR Vs. STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The present writ petition is directed against two proceedings and two orders passed by the Revenue Officer, respondent No. 2, -0ne, dated 3.12.87 in a proceeding (suo motu Case No. 124/87) under Section 44(2a) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act (herein- after referred to as the "said Act") and the other in a Big Raiyat Case (No.164), dated 4.12.87.

(2.) The present writ petitioner and his wife, respondent No.8, purchased the involved lands from one Bikash Chandra Dhara, respondent No.7, by two registered sale deeds on 1st September, 1982. By a deed of gift executed on 2nd February, 1983 respondent No.8 gifted her purchased property in favour of the writ petitioner. At the time of purchase, the lands stood recorded in the name of the vendor Bikash Chandra Dhara in the finally published records of rights, which were published on 19th July, 1957. Bikash claims to have acquired ownership of the said lands by purchase from one Jagadish Chandra Guria on 12th November, 1953 by registered deed of sale. One Bhagyadhar Bera and eighteen others appeared to have made an application bringing it to the notice of the Revenue Officer concerned that the lands involved were the lands of Suresh Chandra Dhara, father of respondent No.7, who was a big raiyat. On the basis of such application, the disputed proceeding under Section 44(2a) of the said Act had been initiated suo moto by the Revenue Officer. The said proceeding culminated with the impugned order whereby the record of rig4ts were directed to be corrected by incorporating the name of Suresh Chandra Dhara as recorded owner of the said property and since Suresh Chandra Dhara had already retained lands as a big raiyat, the involved lands were directed to vest in the consequential big raiyat proceeding by the other order.

(3.) Before dealing with the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner, I would refer to two points raised on behalf of the respondents, more or less, by way of preliminary objections. The first of such point is that the petitioner, being a post-vesting transferee, is not a necessary party and has no locus standi to maintain the present writ application. In the instant case, I find that in spite of the petitioner being a post-vesting transferee, be was served with a notice and has been made to suffer adverse orders. It cannot, therefore, be said that he bas no right to challenge the propriety of orders, which prejudicially affect him. The authorities cited in support of this contention by the respondents are distinguishable on facts. The other point is about the effect of existence of. an alternative remedy by way of appeal under Section 44(3) of the said Act which the petitioner is alleged to have already taken recourse to. It transpires from the materials supplied that such appeal was filed on 20th of January, 1988 whereas the present writ application was filed on 7th January 1988 and secondly, the subject matters of challenge in the present writ application are two orders-one passed in the suo moto revisional proceeding and the other in the big raiyat case disposed of on the basis of the results in the said suo moto proceeding. The remedy by way of appeal could not be comprehensive enough so as to grant relief to the petitioner with regard to both the adverse orders and as such it cannot operate as a bar in the instant case.