PARUL DAS ROY Vs. ANATH DAS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) It appears that S.C.C. Suit No.3832 of 1978 disposed of by the learned Judge, 6th Bench, Small Causes Court, Calcutta, by his judgment and order dated 19/03/1984 was instituted under Section 41, Chapter VII of the Presidency Small Causes Court Act, 1982 by the present petitioner being the Secretary of Mahila Silpa Ashram and Tailoring College, a registered society situated at 80-82 Bidhan Sarani, Calcutta-4 against the present opposite party describing him as a mere licencee in respect of the disputed suit room. The defence was that the opposite party was the tenant of the same. On a consideration of the evidence adduced by the parties, the ld. Judge concluded that the opposite party was not a tenant and that he was a mere licencee of the disputed premises. He dismissed the proceedings all the same holding that the petitioner was not competent to file the proceedings as she was not authorised to institute the same by the President or the members of the society. Hence this civil revision from the side of the present petitioner. It is urged from the side of the petitioner that the proceeding was very properly instituted by her in her own name and that the ld. Judge made a mistake by holding that she was not competent to do that and her contention is naturally challenged from the side of the opposite party. The opposite party also challenges the decision of the ld. Judge to the effect that he was a mere licencee in respect of the disputed premises.

(2.) The first point that has to be decided is whether the ld. Judge was right in holding that the petitioner was not competent to institute the suit. In this connection so it appears, the Id. Judge relied upon Rule 14 of the Rules and Regulations of the Silpa Ashram which lays down that the President of the said Silpa Ashram shall preside in all meetings and give directions in all affairs of the society and that the secretary shall be the executive officer and shall act according to direction of the President of the Committee. From this, the ld. Judge concluded that the secretary of the institution could not institute a suit or a proceeding without express permission from the President. The 1d. Judge, however, failed to notice that as per Rule 28 of the said Rules all suits and legal proceedings by or against the society were to be in the name of the secretary. It is also pointed out that the last sentence of the aforesid Rule 14 authorised the secretary to conduct, defend and compound any legal proceedings on behalf of the society or its affairs or otherwise concerning the affairs of the society. It is also pointed out from the side of the petitioner that the resolution of the executive committee of the Silpa Ashram passed on 1 4/07/1979 (Ext.2) recites that the Court had to be moved on behalf of the society for evicting the present opposite party from the disputed premises and that a proceeding was actually instituted for doing the same. It appears, therefore, under R.28 that the proceeding was rightly instituted by or in the name of the secretary who was competent to conduct the same under the provision of R.14. Besides the resolution dated 14/07/1979 (Ext.2) ratified the institution of the proceeding. In view of the circumstances, I am of the view that the present petitioner was perfectly competent to institute and conduct the proceedings against the present opposite party. The finding and the decision of the learned Judge to the contrary cannot be supported.

(3.) Next to the question as to whether the learned Jude was quite right in holding that the opposite party was the licencee of the disputed premises. It appears that a receipt (Ext. C) for Rs. 40.00 shown to have been paid and received as donation was produced from the side of the opposite party to establish his case that he was a tenant and not a licencee. Since this receipt did not contain the signature of the opposite party on its back the learned Judge refused to hold that it evidenced a tenancy. The learned Advocate for the opposite party urges that this was not sufficient ground for refusing to hold that the receipt in question showed the existence of a tenancy. He urges further that in that view of the matter the case may be sent back to the learned Judge on remand for a fresh decision on this point.