LACHMAN SINGH Vs. THE STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The impugned order of conviction, passed by the trial Court and affirmed in appeal, is under Sec. 4(1) of the Bengal Criminal Law (Industrial Areas) Amendment Act, 1942, which provides that "whoever has in his possession... anything which there is reason to believe to have been stolen or fraudulently obtained, shall, if he fails to account for such possession... be liable to fine which may. extend to Rs.100/ -, or to imprisonment for a term which may extend to 6 months". The order of conviction has been assailed in this revision, mainly on the ground that the prosecution has not discharged its onus to prove that there is reason to believe that the goods were stolen or fraudulently obtained and that being so, the accused had no liability to account for his possession, and that even though the accused tempted, though not required to do so, to account for such possession by adducing evidence, the Courts below were wrong in looking into and scrutinizing such evidence and to hold therefrom that the goods could be reasonably believed to be stolen or fraudulently obtained and that the accused failed to account for them. There are a number of decisions of this Court under the provisions of Sec. 4(1) of the Bengal Criminal Law (Industrial Areas) Amendment Act, 1942, as well as other allied provisions, e.g., Sec. 54A of the Calcutta Police Act of 1866, to the effect that before the accused can be required to account for possession, the initial onus to prove that there is reason to believe that the goods in his possession were (sic)oleri or fraudulently obtained is to be discharged by the prosecution. We do not think that any citation is at all necessary for so obvious a proposition which emerges not only from the relevant provisions extracted hereinabove, but which is also firmly grounded in our law of evidence. Under that general law whoever prosecutes a proceeding, civil or criminal, is to bear the burden to prove the case, for, as pointed out in Sec. 102, Evidence Act, "the burden of proof lies on that person who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side". Under the lex scripts of the Evidence Act, there is no burden of proof and, as would appear from Sec. 3 thereof, a fact is said to be "proved", both for the purpose of civil as well as criminal proceedings, "when, after considering (sic) materials before it, a Court either believes it to exist, or considers its existence so probable, that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists". But it is the extreme anxiety and the very high regard of our laws for personal liberties of man, now enshrined in Article 21 of our Constitution, that has made all the difference between the standard of proof in a Civil and in a Criminal case and since a conviction in a criminal case may very often go to abridge or affect that personal liberty, the law of evidence in criminal proceedings has stood supplemented By the doctrine of proof beyond reasonable doubt.

(2.) Be that as it may, while the prosecution may, as it obviously does, have the burden of proving the guilt of the accused, as (to borrow from Sec. 102 of the Evidence Act) it would fail if no evidence at all are given on either side, this is never the law that when evidence has in fact been adduced by both the prosecution and the defence, a Court cannot hold the charge to be proved on the basis of the evidence adduced by the defence, simply and solely on the ground that no such evidence has come from the side of the prosecution and that the evidence adduced by or on behalf of the prosecution, by itself, does not prove the guilt. The accused, having no onus to prove innocence, may be under no obligation to adduce any evidence. But if he chooses to adduce evidence, though not required to do so, and such evidence proves his guilt, he can not be heard to say that the Court is to exclude such evidence from consideration as he was to adduce, and could have adduced, none. We would like to emphasise even at the cost of repetition, that if. the accused, though having no onus to do so, has nevertheless adduced evidence, the Court, not only may, but rather is under an obligation to take into consideration all such evidence and may base its order of conviction thereon, even though the prosecution has not, on its own, succeeded to prove the charge.

(3.) To come to the case at hand, all that Sec. 4(1) of the Bengal Criminal Law (Industrial Areas) Amendment Act, 1942 requires is that the Court must find that there is reason to believe that the goods are stolen or fraudulently obtained before it can convict the accused for his failure to account for possession. If in a given case the prosecution fails to adduce satisfactory evidence to enable the Court to come to such a finding, the Court would have then no case to proceed with and must therefore fold its hands. But where, as here, the accused has nevertheless chosen to adduce evidence and such evidence enables the Court to hold that there is reason to believe the goods to be stolen or fraudulently obtained, the Court would be perfectly justified to convict the accused on such evidence if he fails to account for possession thereof. Accepting the doctrine that an offence must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, we have never understood it to be the law that even where the Court can and does find it to be so proved from the evidence adduced by the defence, the Court must still bang the prosecution solely on the ground that it could not, on its own, bring the charge home.