OM PRAKASH Vs. RANIGANJ MUNICIPALITY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The Food Inspector, who has filed this complaint, is admittedly not authorised to do so under the provisions of S.20(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 and as such can only do so with the written consent of a competent authority as specified in S.20(1). Such a written consent appears in the body of the complaint itself; has assailed the validity of that 'written consent' and but Mr. Ghosh, the learned Counsel for the accused petitioner, has sought to fortify his contention on the strength of some observations in a two-Judge Bench decision of the Supreme Court in A.K. Roy v. State of Punjab, AIR 1986 SC 2160 . It appears that in that case the Supreme Court has observed (of AIR) : that the authority "can only give his consent in writing when he is satisfied that a prima facie case exists in the facts of a particular case and record(s) his reasons for the launching of such prosecution in the "public interest". Looking at the written consent in the body of the complaint, we, however, entirely disagree with the contention of Mr. Ghosh that the written consent endorsed on the complaint shows that the authority was not and could not have been satisfied that "a prima facie case exists in the facts of the case". The fact of exposing for sale and selling mustard oil for human consumption by the alleged offender, of the Food Inspector taking sample therefrom and sending the same to the Public Analyst and the receipt of the report of the Analyst showing the food to be adulterated, clearly appeared in the body of the complaint on which the "written consent" itself was endorsed and on the materials on record at present it cannot be presumed that the authority according the consent could not or did not take note of all these materials, including the original Report of the Public Analyst which was also attached by that authority to its order according consent. And if that is so, then we do not know what more could be necessary for the authority to be satisfied that a prima facie case has been disclosed on the materials before it. We do not think it to be the law that the authority according written consent must hold some sort of Committal Inquiry, as understood in our Code of Criminal Procedure, before it can accord consent to prosecution and we have no doubt that going to such a length would be out-stretching these provisions beyond all legitimate and legally permissible limits.

(2.) Mr. Ghosh has, however, urged that, as observed in A.K. Roy (supra), the authority according consent is to "record his reasons for launching of such prosecution in the public interest", but that there is nothing in the written consent or anywhere in the record to show that the authority has made any such record. We do not think that Mr. Ghosh is right in relying on those observations as authority for the view that not only the authority must apply its mind to the relevant and material facts before according consent, but must also further recite in so many words, almost in the form of ritualisticchanting, that launching of prosecution is necessary in the public interest. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned us, we must not treat each and every observation in its judgement as if it were Statute or a Scripture, but we must try to ascertain the reason behind the observations, after reading the judgement as a whole and that, wherever possible, in the light of and in tune with its earlier observations on the point.

(3.) We must note that the question as to how a written consent under S.20(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act was to be accorded and/or what it should contain was not in issue, even remotely, before the two-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in A.K. Roy (1986 Cri LJ 2037) (supra) and the only question that arose for determination was whether a person or authority, being authorised by the Government only to institute complaint, can, in his or its turn, authorise another person to institute the same, and the Supreme Court, on a consideration of the relevant provisions of S.20 and other provisions returned a categorical negative answer. The observations relied on by Mr. Ghosh, extracted hereinabove, were therefore, obviously obiter. We surely cannot brush aside observations of the Supreme Court, even if mere obiter; but as we shall indicate hereinafter, we cannot read obiter as a blanket algebraic formula, but must try to understand the same in consonance and in conformity with the observations in the earlier or later decisions on the point, where they are more in the nature of ratio rather than obiter.