DEBABRATA CHAKRABORTY Vs. M.K. DAS & ORS.

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The power of this Court to expunge remarks or observations from the judgment of the courts subordinate to it can and has never been doubted. What was doubted was the power of this Court do so when the proceeding in which it was made was not brought before it by way of regular appeal or revision or in the exercise of some other statutory jurisdiction. But the two decisions of the Supreme Court in Raghubir Saran (AIR 1964 5C i) and in Mohammad Nairn (AIR 1964 SC 703) must now be taken to have settled the question beyond the pale of any controversy and have held that this Court can do so in the exercise of its inherent powers even independently of any appeal or revision presented to it. True, both the Supreme Court decisions related to criminal matters and the power of the High Court to expunge remarks from the judgments or orders of the Courts below, independently of any appeal or revision pending before it, was recognised and traced with reference to Sec. 561A of the preceding Code of Criminal Procedure of 1898, now replaced, almost totidem verbis, by Sec. 482 of the present Code of Criminal Procedure of 1973. But there can be no manner of doubt that the same would be the position in civil matters as well because, as is well settled, neither Sec. 561A of the old Code of Criminal Procedure did, nor Sec. '+82 of the present Code or Sec. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure does, confer any particular power, but only saves all the gamut of powers inherently possessed by this Court to make such orders as may be necessary to secure the ends of justice or prevent the abuse of curial process. And, therefore, if, as ruled by the Supreme Court in Raghubir Saran (supra) and in Mohammad Nairn (supra), this Court can in a fit case expunge remarks or observations from the judgment or order of the subordinate Courts in criminal matters independently of any appeal or revision therefrom pending before it in the exercising of inherent powers saved by Sec. 561A of the old and Sec. 482 of the new Code of Criminal Procedure, this Court can obviously do the same in civil matters also in exercise of such inherent powers saved by Sec. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It may be noted that the aforesaid two decisions of the Supreme Court have been referred to and relied on by a recent two judge bench of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Patnaik (1985 -2 Supreme Court Cases 569). The matters at hand, however, has been brought before us in our supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, not at the instance of any party to the proceeding, but by the lawyer engaged by a party before the appellate authority, for expunging certain remarks made against him by the appellate authority. But if, as ruled by the Supreme Court in the decisions referred to above, we can exercise this power of there is any regular matter pending before us by way of appeal, revision or otherwise, then the question whether our supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 could be invoked by a lawyer, without the party whom he represented, for expunging some observations made against that counsel personally, need not detain us. The question as to what remedy would be available to a lawyer engaged by a party for expunction of remarks made against him was adverted to by the majority in Raghubir Saran (supra, at 7, para 19), and it would appear that the majority was inclined to think that the lawyer, though he may not move in appeal or revision, may apply invoking the inherent powers of the High Court. And then again, it is also well -settled that once a matter is brought before us in our revisional or supervisory jurisdiction and we find that there are matters which warrant our intervention, the standi or competency of the person to invoke our jurisdiction may lose all relevance, as we could have called for the records on our own. Therefore, to the merits now.

(2.) The Chief Judge, Small Causes Court, while hearing an appeal as the Appellate Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, thought that the Advocate for the Appellant, who is the petitioner here, behaved with such arrogance and insubordination and caused such annoyance, insult and interruption as to amount to an offence under Sec. 228 of the Penal Code. The Chief Judge recorded these facts not only in the order -sheet on that day, being No. 10 dated 30.7.88, but also described in considerable details in the judgment itself delivered on 6.8.88 as to how and in what manner and with what postures and gesticulation the Advocate conducted himself. In the order No. 10 dated 30.7.88, the Judge directed the Advocate "to leave the Court and not to appear again" and in the judgment also delivered on 6.6.88, the Judge recorded that the Advocate "was immediately asked to leave that Court room and not to appear in my Court in future as there are decent lawyers galore". The Chief Judge also directed that a copy of his judgment was to be forward to the appellant, the Controller of Telcom Stores, Calcutta.

(3.) The petitioner, on coming to know about this, filed an application under Sec. 151, Code of Civil Procedure and while asserting that he always had and has the highest regard for the Court and that he had never behaved in any manner to annoy or insult the learned Judge, submitted further that "the entire incident so far as the petitioner is concerned is unfortunate and the same must have been an outcome of some misunderstanding and the petitioner sincerely regrets, if such misunderstanding has been caused due to any act on the part of the petitioner". The Judge rejected the application after observing that "fair play and justice do not demand that the observations should be expunged", "the petitioner had no business to annoy or insult the Court as to all intents and purposes he is an officer of the Court" and that "considering the gravity of the offence it must be stated that he was lightly dealt with" and that "he should see that in future he does not invite such comments from any other Court."