SAILEN GHOSH Vs. LAND ACQUISITION COLLECTOR CALCUTTA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This Rule was obtained by the petitioner against an order of the Land Acquisition Collector refusing his petition for Reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act.

(2.) The circumstances leading to the present proceedings were as follows: The disputed property appears to have been acquired under the Land Acquisition Act and awards appear to have been made by the Collector on December 7, 1962, and June 26, 1963. The acquisition was made under the Land Development and Planning Act but, admittedly, to such acquisitions the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act apply. The petitioner claims to have acquired interest in the disputed property under a conveyance, dated June 9, 1950. Of the above acquisition, however, he did not receive any notice under Section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act, although at that time he was one of the co-owners of the acquired property. According to the petitioner, he came to know of the above acquisition and awards on January 22, 1964, and, as under the said awards compensation had been paid to persons including the predecessors (vendors) of the petitioner, he first applied before the Land Acquisition Collector challenging the validity of the said awards and praying for cancellation of the same. This application was made on January 24, 1964. Thereafter, as no notice was taken of the above application, he applied before the Collector on March 3, 1964, for a Reference to a Civil Court under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act objecting to the awards in favour of opposite party Nos. 2-10 as also on the question of adequacy of the valuation or compensation. This application was eventually rejected by the Collector upon the view that the petitioner could not claim to be a person entitled to apply for a Reference under Section 18 in view of the terms of the said section. The relevant statutory provision, so far as this part of the case is concerned, is Section 18(1) which is in these terms: Any person interested who has not accepted the award may by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court, whether his objection be to the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation, the persons to whom it is payable, or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested. According to the Collector, the above provision refers to 'person interested' as defined in Section 3(b) which reads as follows: In this Act, unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context, - (b) the expression 'person interested' includes all persons claiming an interest in compensation to be made on account of the acquisition of land under this Act ????.

(3.) According to the Collector, the petitioner would not be a person interested within the meaning of the above definition inasmuch as he could not be said to be a person claiming an interest in the compensation to be made on account of acquisition of the land under the Act, as in the absence of a claim by him before the Collector before the making of the award, he could not claim that status. The Collector was further of the opinion that the petitioner also could not fulfill the other requirement of Section 18(1), namely, of 'a person who has not accepted the award' as he, not being a party before the Collector, the question of his acceptance or non-acceptance of the award made by the Collector, could not arise. Upon the above view, the Collector was further of the opinion that the proceedings having been finalized by the awards on December 7, 1962, and March 26, 1963, and the Collector's function having ceased in respect of the matters mentioned in Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, it was beyond the competence of the Collector to determine whether the petitioner, who was not a party before him, would be a 'person interested' for purposes of Section 18. In our opinion, the learned Collector has taken a wrong view of the law. The definition of 'person interested', as quoted above, is an inclusive definition which obviously does not exclude the ordinary meaning of the said expression. It only serves to enlarge or widen the same. A person, who is the owner of the land, would certainly come under the description of a 'person interested' and, as the petitioner was admittedly a co-owner at the date of the acquisition in question, he would obviously satisfy the requirement of being a 'person interested' within the meaning of the Act and for purposes of Section 18. As, again, he was not a party to the award, the question of his acceptance of the award would not arise and it can safely be said that he is a person who has not accepted the award. Indeed, in case of such negative conditions leading to a particular legal result, the condition is deemed to be satisfied if the existence of the fact is or has been rendered impossible by circumstances. Vide, in this connection, (1) Rai Ram Tarun Banerjee Bahadur (since deceased) and after his Sashi Coomar Banerjee & Anr. v. Mrs. D. J. Hill & Ors., AIR 1949 (OFC) 135(141); see also (2) Srimati Renuka Bose v. Rai Manmatha Nath Bose & Ors., (1945) 49 CWN 491 (493 PC). In the instant case, it was impossible for the petitioner to accept the award as he was not a party to the same, and therefore, he will ex-hypothesi satisfy the conditions of being a person who has not accepted the award. In the above view, we hold that the petitioner would have locus standi to apply for a Reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. This view of ours would be well-supported, at any rte, indirectly by the decision of the Supreme Court, reported in the (3) State of Punjab v. Mst. Qaisar Jehan Begum and Anr., AIR 1963 SC 1604 where, under similar circumstances, competency of the Reference and the locus standi of the person concerned to apply for Reference under Section 18, was actually upheld by the Supreme Court. Vide in this connection the very pertinent observations of the Supreme Court in (4) Sundarlal v. Paramsukhdas & Ors., AIR 1968 SC 366 (370-371) where their Lordships quote, inter alia, a very relevant extract from the judgment of the same Court, in (5) Dr. G.H. Grant v. The State of Bihar, AIR 1966 SC 237 (244) on the scheme and object of the Land Acquisition Act in the following terms: The scheme of the Land Acquisition Act is that all disputes about the quantum of compensation must be decided by resort to the procedure prescribed by the Act: It is also intended that disputes about the right of owners to compensation being ancillary to the principal dispute should be decided by the Court to which power is entrusted. Jurisdiction of the Court in this behalf is not restricted to ceases of apportionment, but extends to adjudication of disputes as to the persons who are entitled to receive compensation, and there is nothing in Section 30 which excludes a reference to Court of a dispute raised by a person on whom the title of the owner of land has, since the award, devolved. Indeed, the said last-cited authority (5) Supra, p. 244 Last part of para 17) is even more extreme as it recognizes, inter alia, the right of a person on whom the title has developed since the award to claim Reference.