GIRDHARDAS KOTHARI Vs. INCOME TAX OFFICER A WARD

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In this application, the petitioner, Girdhardas Kothari, challenges a notice, dated the 27th March, 1963, issued under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), for the assessment year 1946-47. The notice is in the usual form alleging that the Income-tax Officer has reason to believe that the petitioner's income for the assessment year 1946-47 has escaped assessment within the meaning of Section 147 of the Act.

(2.) The reasons in support of the issue of the impugned notice have been disclosed in paragraph 5 of the affidavit of Sukumar Bose affirmed on the 30th April, 1969. The substance of the allegations is that the petitioner and one D. J. Dastur were said to be partners of a firm called Girdharclas Maheswari & Company which was assessed as an unregistered firm in the assessment year 1946-47. According to the said affidavit, it is claimed by the assessee that the firm has been dissolved in the year 1947. It is further alleged that, in or about 1963, it came to the notice of the Income-tax Officer that there were certain cash Credit entries in the books of the firm to the extent of Rs. 1,85,000 said to have been received from Shri P.O. Himatsingka and Rs. 1,00,000 from one Bhagabati Prosad Prabhudayat. Both those cash credits were relevant for the assessment in the assessment year 1946-47, but the same had not been duly considered in the regular assessment of the firm. According to the said affidavit, action has been taken to reopen the assessment of both the petitioner as well as the said firm. The said firm having been dissolved, it has become necessary, according to the deponent, to reopen the case of the petitioner.

(3.) Mr. Siddharta Sankar Roy 'appearing on behalf of the petitioner contends that, even assuming all the allegations contained in the affidavit of Sukumar Bose to be correct, they may amount to an allegation of omission or failure on the part of the said firm to disclose fully and truly all material facts relevant to its assessment for the assessment year 1946-47. The said reasons, however, do not amount to any omission or failure on the part of the petitioner who is the assessee according to the impugned notice before me, to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for the petitioner's assessment. In other words, even if the allegations are assumed to be correct, they do not justify the reopening of the assessment against the petitioner.