BEJOY DAW Vs. ALOKA DAW

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The history of this matrimonial litigation by the husband Bejoy Daw, now appellant, against his wife Aloka Daw, now respondent, for restitution of conjugal rights divides itself into four stages-

(2.) The first stage presents no problem. The correspondence that is seen in and about this period is quite the normal exchange of letters to and from between Bejoy and Aloka, the newly married couple. Here is a resume of such letters, interspersed with comments, resting on evidence:

(3.) [After giving the resume of the letters, their Lordships proceeded]. Such contemporaneous letters speak for themselves. Leaving aside periodic small rubs -- and a married life which is free from any such rub must be rare indeed -- what we see is a happy couple, one pining for the other. So, up to the end of December 1957, there happened little to break the home, no matter what the mutual recriminations of Bejoy and Aloka have been in the prior litigation --matrimonial suit No. 2 of 1961--or here. Taking our stand on this, after we had had an exhaustive opening from Mr. Bankim Dutt, appearing for Bejoy, we proceeded to do our duty, in terms of Section 23, Sub-section (2), of the Hindu Marriage Act, 25 of 1955, to bring about a reconciliation between Bejoy and Aloka, in the fond hope that they would go back to those happy days of August-December 1957 and start their life over again from there, completely blotting out from their mind all that had happened meanwhile, irrespective of the right or wrong of either. We, therefore, invited them to our chamber, putting aside their counsel, as indeed counsel themselves wanted us to do, and pleaded with Bejoy and Aloka to give their married life a trial at the least for a month, to start with. But our pleading went in vain. Aloka was in dread of Bejoy who, she apprehended, would arrange things in such a manner that it would facilitate his having a divorce on false allegations. She therefore, expressed her determination not to return to the matrimonial home even for a month. Bejoy addressed her, with our permission, and pointed out to her that three lives -- her own, Bejoy's and the child's--were being ruined by her intransigence. But she remained adamant, because for her husband's past conduct and utterances. Since that was troubling Aloka, we suggested to Bejoy whether or not he could see his way to express sincere regret for what she was feeling sore about. Bejoy said; "If you so direct, I am ready to express my regret." We at once made it clear, direct we would not, for reconciliation is reconciliation, not coercion, far less judicial coercion. But an expression of regret would even not move Aloka a whit, because she was unable to rely upon her husband's word. So, it was futile to proceed further and, much to our disappointment, our endeavour to bring about a reconciliation between the parties failed. For that, we blame neither Aloka nor Bejoy. If Aloka is within her right to refuse to return to the matrimonial home, Bejoy is equally within his right not to go further than he has gone. We, therefore, enter into the merits of the appeal with an open mind, and without the slightest prejudice to either, for the stance each takes, during our attempt to effect a reconciliation.