LAWS(CAL)-1869-8-29

NABAKUMAR HALDAR Vs. BHABASUNDARI DEBI AND ANOTHER

Decided On August 25, 1869
NABAKUMAR HALDAR Appellant
V/S
BHABASUNDARI DEBI AND ANOTHER Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) I think there is no ground for this special appeal. It seems that the plaintiff sued to recover possession of property purchased by her husband from a Hindu widow named Dinamayi. The person who contested the validity of that sale is the brother-in-law of Dinamayi. It seems that for sometime after her husband's death, Dinamayi lived with her brother-in-law, but after a time he ill-treated her and turned her out, remaining in possession of her property. She then went to the house of her father, who maintained her for some time, but who afterwards finding it difficult to do so any longer, and naturally enough thinking that this burden should not be unnecessarily cast upon him, refused to maintain her any longer. She then, on the grounds that she was otherwise unable to discharge the debts of her husband, to provide for his funeral ceremonies, and to maintain herself in any other way, sold this property to the plaintiff's husband. That allegation has been found by the Judge in the lower appellate Court upon good and sufficient grounds to be true, and the only objection now made before us in special appeal is that she ought not to have parted with the property out-and-out, but should have endeavored to raise money upon it by mortgage or otherwise, she having no power to alienate the property altogether. Now I feel almost certain that this point has been already disposed of by some of the Benches of this Court, but whether it is so or not, I have no doubt whatever that in such a case as this there is no precise rule of law which obliges a widow to proceed in any particular way, and the only question for the Court to consider is whether she has exceeded her powers, and these are always to be measured by the necessities of the case; but whether or no a sale or mortgage was the proper mode of proceeding is a question of fact depending on all the circumstances, and not one of law for us to consider in special appeal. I think therefore that this special appeal must be dismissed with costs, including the costs of appearance of the second respondent.