BANK OF BENGAL Vs. R CURRIE AND CO

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Of the two questions in the case of Bank of Bengal v. R. Currie and Co., which the learned Recorder of Rangoon has referred to this Court, it seems to me that we can only give an answer to the first. The second question does not arise in the suit. It is a question relating to the execution of the decree in the suit which has been referred, and of the execution of other decrees; but no application has as yet been made for the execution of the decree in this suit, and we are totally unacquainted with any of the circumstances relating to the other decrees. As to the first question, taking the facts of this suit to be that, on the presentation of the plaint, the defendant then and there appeared and confessed judgment, I think that the Judge was not obliged at that time to hear the defendant. The Judge was at liberty to follow the ordinary procedure of the Court, and to order that the hearing of the case should be fixed for a certain date, and to decline to hear the defendant until that date arrived. Even if section 98 applies, as has been suggested, that section lays down that when the parties are agreed in a suit, the decision of the suit shall be passed in accordance with such agreement, but no time is fixed. Even if the agreement is filed on any day antecedent to that fixed for hearing, the Judge is not bound to consider the suit in any way until the date fixed for hearing. Certainly if the Judge entertains any doubts as to the ideality of the parties or their good faith, he should not pass an immediate decree, but should take up the suit on the date fixed for its hearing, and then pass what decree is proper.

(2.) On the other hand, it seems to me that every Judge has a discretion where parties have come to a mutual agreement, or where the defendant has confessed judgment, to decide the suit at once in accordance with such agreement or confession. It is, in most instances, for convenience of the parties, as well as of the Court, that such decrees should be passed without delay. But it is obvious that where there is any doubt of the good faith of the parties or of their identity, the Court would not exercise that discretion, but would allow the case to come an at the regular fixed time. In the case now under reference, the learned Recorder gave the plaintiffs a decree on the date on which the defendants confessed judgment. He had a discretion to do so. The decree was a legal decree, and the plaintiffs are entitled to have it dated on the day on which it was passed.

(3.) In this case, I think the first question pub to us by the learned Recorder ought to be answered in the affirmative.