AJONNISSA BIBI Vs. SURJA KANT ACHARJI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) I am of opinion that this rule ought to be discharged with costs. The application to this Court was to exercise its extraordinary powers under Section 15 of the Charter Act, with a view to set aside certain proceedings of the Principal Sudder Ameen of Mymensingh, who had admitted a review after the lapse of more than three years. The words in Section 15 of the Charter under which the applicant can come to this Court, are that each of the High Courts "shall have superintendence over all Courts which may be subject to its appellate jurisdiction." I quite concur in the interpretation put upon those words by a decision of this Court passed by Mr. Justice Norman and Mr. Justice L.S. Jackson, Bhyrub Chunder Chunder v. Shama Soonderee Debea (6 W.R., Act X Rul., 68), viz., that that section gives to the High Court "large powers over the inferior Courts to compel them to do any act which by law they should do, to command them to execute all powers with which they are vested, and to restrain them from meddling when they have no jurisdiction." In the present case the Principal Sudder Ameen has admitted the petition for review more than three years after the decree on what, to my mind, appears to be a finding of fact that there were just and reasonable causes, such as are contemplated in Section 377, Act VIII of 1859, for the delay made in presenting the application. The substance of his judgment is that, as the mother died between the time of the institution of the suit, and before the passing of the decree, and as there was some delay consequent upon the Court of Wards taking charge of the estates of the minor, and as, immediately after the Court of Wards gave over charge of the estates to the petitioner after he had arrived at his majority, the petitioner used due diligence, and applied for a review within 90 days, there were just and reasonable grounds for admitting the review.

(2.) I do not think that the case of Mowri Bewa v. Surendra Nath Roy (1) bears upon the present question, because the whole case there was based upon proceedings after decree; whereas, in this case, nothing has been done in the shape of re-trial or a second judgment and decree. Another case decided in this Court has been mentioned to us in support of the application, but it has not been placed before us in any such shape that we can notice it. I would adhere to the rule that the Court should take notice of those decisions only which are actually placed before it for consideration, or are cited from the printed reports.

(3.) It has been argued by Baboo Anukul Chandra Mookerjee that there should have been, in the first place, a proceeding under Section 377, Act VIII of 1859, and a finding whether under that section there was any good and reasonable cause shown for the delay in filing the petition, and then another proceeding under Section 378 of that Act for admitting the review.