MILAN KANTI MONDAL Vs. UNION OF INDIA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The learned Advocate for the petitioner has taken me through the order impugned. He submits that the writ petition is directed against a hyper-technical approach of the learned Tribunal by which his client's right to challenge his termination of gainful employment from which his client earns his livelihood has been jeopardized for the technicality of limitation under a special statute. This is the only aspect he has argued before me today. Even though I have remarked the difference in the wordings given by the Hon'ble High Court of Judicature, Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad (as it then was) and what had actually been prayed for by his client the learned Tribunal has taken umbrage at the petitioner's delay of almost four years in applying for a certified copy of the order dated July 23, 2004 on the basis of which the proceedings have been reopened before a coordinate bench whereafter it was transferred to the learned Tribunal.

(2.) Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned Advocate appearing for the respondents takes a preliminary point of maintainability. He submits that in view of Section 30 of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 any decision passed by the learned Tribunal is subject to only appeal before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India and is otherwise final. He submits that in the face of such clear legislative intendment the writ Court ought not to interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

(3.) I have considered the submissions made by Mr. Bhattacharjee. I feel that the power of judicial review which has been entrusted to this Court not only under Article 226 of the Constitution of India but also in exercise of constituent power provided by the Letters' Patent 1862 and now 1865. The power to test an inferior Tribunal's decision making process where the Tribunal is within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court cannot be deprived by a mere statute. I am fortified in this view by the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in L. Chandrakumar vs. Union of India and Anr. Reported in AIR 1997 SC 1125. In that case even though the Administrative Tribunal Act had expressly forbidden any recourse to any Court except the Hon'ble Supreme Court, by interpretation, a larger bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court had reversed the judgment of Sampat Kumar and held that the power of judicial review is a basic feature of the Constitution of India and even if a Tribunal acted as a Court of first instance the judicial review of the Tribunal's orders by a superior Court of record like the High Court could not be taken away even by a constitutional amendment.