SONY KABUSHIKI KAISHA Vs. MAHALUXMI TEXTILE MILLS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS reference arises out of an appeal in a suit for infringement and passing off of the trade mark SONY. The plaintiffs in the suit (Title Suit No. 129 of 1997) instituted before the learned District Judge, Alipore, 24-Parganas (South) are Sony Kabushiki Kaisha, a company organised under the laws of Japan (who are also known as Sony Corporation ). In the suit, they alleged violation of their trade mark rights in respect of the trade mark SONY by the defendants/respondents. The appellants being the plaintiffs in the suit, claim to be a multinational company engaged primarily in the business of manufacture and sale of diverse range of goods including video and audio equipments, televisions and other electronic goods under the trade mark SONY. The complain against the respondents is that they were applying the same trade mark on their products, being hosiery goods, briefs and underwear, without the authorisation or consent of the appellants. In connection with this suit, an application for interim injunction was taken out by the appellants before the trial court, seeking restraint order on use of the mark SONY by the respondents. Such prayer was rejected. Against this order of rejection of prayer for temporary injunction by the trial court, appeal before this Court was preferred by Sony Corporation.

(2.) BEFORE the Hon'ble Division Bench hearing out the appeal, a point was taken by the respondents that the class or category of goods of the parties being entirely different, the appellants were not entitled to relief under the principles of passing off. The Hon'ble Division Bench observed:

(3.) ON an identical point, however, there is an earlier decision of an Hon'ble division Bench of this Court in the case of Rustom Ali Molla and Ors. Vs. Bata shoe Company reported in AIR 1957 Cal 120 in which a contrary view has been expressed. Two passages from this judgment were considered by the Hon'ble division Bench in the appeal out of which this reference arises, before referring the matter for being reconsidered by a larger bench. These are contained in paragraphs 9 and 17 of the Report, and the relevant portion of this judgment, as recorded by the Division Bench in the order dated 4th August 1999 are reproduced below: