(1.) This appeal under the Letters Patent is directed against a judgment dated 10th March, 1998 by a learned Single Judge of this Court whereby the writ application filed by Respondent No. 4 in this appeal has been dismissed. Respondent No. 4 had filed writ petition No. 2886 of 1994 along with G.A. No. 2066 of 1995 wherein he had challenged the order dated 24-06-94 passed by Respondent No. 1, the Appropriate Authority consituted under section 269-UB of the Income Tax Act. In the writ application the appellant herein Murlidhar Ratanlal Exports Limited and Digvijay Cement Company Ltd., Respondent No. 4 herein, had entered into an agreement of sale on 7th March, 1994 in their capacities as proposed Vendee and Vendor respectively in respect of the sale of a Mill known as "Hasting Jute Mill" situated at G.T. Road, Rishra as a going concern, inclusive of assets and liabilities as per the terms and conditions contained in the said Agreement. The property included land measuring 105 bighas and 18 cottahs and the structures raised thereon along with all errections etc., inclusive of fixitures and fittings and various plants and machineries. The total consideration by way of agreed sale price in respect of the entire property was fixed at Rs. 777.50 lacs free from all encumbrances and charges etc. Since the value of the proposed sale transaction exceeded the prescribed limit as per section 269-UC of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (Act for short), Form No. 37-I in terms of the said section and he Rules made under the Act was submitted before Respondent No.1 on 22nd March, 1994 along with the copy of the aforesaid Agreement dated 7th March, 1994 seeking permission/no objection from Respondent No.1 in respect of the sale of the said property. However, respondent No.1 neither granted the "no objection" certificate, nor passed any order of taking recourse to the exercise of the power of pre-emptive purchase of the property by the Central Government, as aviailable to it under section 269-UD of the Act and instead disposed of the application of the vendor and the vendee by passing the following Order:
(2.) It was the aforesaid Order of respondent No. 1 which was the subject-matter of challenge in the writ application filed by respondent No. 4, the Vendor in the aforesaid agreement for sale which, as observed earlier, came to be dismissed by the learned Single Judge vide his judgment dated 10th March, 1988.
(3.) At the outset we may observe that in the impugned order of 24-06-94 passed by the respondent No. 1, one ground for not granting the no objection certificate was the so called violation of the provisions of Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976 since, according to respondent No. 1, the land in question exceeded the limit/ceiling prescribed under section 5(3) of the Act. However, it was very fairly and very frankly conceded before us by the learned advocate appearing for respondent No. 1 that this part of the Order dated 24-06-94 is not sustainable in law at all and he would not press for the same. It may also be noted that the learned Single Judge also in the judgment under appeal did not deal with this part of the Order at all and restricted himself only to the question of the transfer of ownership/possession of the land, which actually was the reason for dismissing the writ application.