M. ELIAS PVT. LTD. Vs. FEDERAL BANK

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In this revisional petition the petitioners being respondents in a proceeding under section 19(3) of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 being O A. No. 190 of 1996 of the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Calcutta has in substance challenged the appointment of a Special Officer directing him to make an inventory over the assets of the petitioner-company. Though the order impugned here is dated 21.1.98, the appointment of the Special Officer was made as long back as on 22.11.96. It may be mentioned that by the order dated 22.11.96, the appointment of the Special Officer was made by an ex parte order when the summons under section 19(3) of the Act had not yet beet served. Since the objection petition filed by the petitioners against the aforesaid order dated 22.11 96 had been refused by the Tribunal, the petitioners had moved this Court on an earlier occasion as well under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India and, thereupon, by an order dated 6.3.1997 passed in Civil Revision No. C.O. 667 of 1997, this Court had set aside the order dated 19 2.97 of the Tribunal and directed the Tribunal to consider the application afresh and give reasoned order. It was then that the Tribunal has passed a reasoned order after hearing both the parties and, by that order, the appointment of a Special Officer has been affirmed and the Special Officer has been given direction to submit a report immediately as called for.

(2.) The main thrust of the petitioners in this revision is that the impugned order was not sustainable in law as per a recent decision of this Court by a Single Bench in the case of In re : Grapco Industries Limited and Another Vs. Industrial Credit Investment Corporation of India Limited and also some other cases, reported in [1998 WBLR (Cal) 269]: (1998)1 Cal LJ 78. After I was taken through this decision what I find material for the present is that it was only the practice of passing an ad interim tier and, that too, being ex parte in nature has been deprecated in view tithe mandatory requirement under Clause 3 of section 19 of the Recovery if Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 for service of summons upon the defendant before granting any relief. What has happened in this case is that the defendants/petitioners have been heard nice over the issue of appointment of a Special Officer, once on 19.2.97, to they had filed an objection to the order dated 22.11.96 appointing lie Special Officer ex parte and again for the second time on 21.1.98 when a chance of fresh hearing was offered in the light and the direction given by this Court in C.O. No. 667 of 1997. I, therefore, find that the order of appointment of a Special Officer in the instant case has been ultimately passed by a reasoned order upon hearing the counsel for both the parties. In that view of the matter, it was now no more open for the petitioners (to raise any objection in the light of the authority referred to above i.e. (1998)1 Cal LJ 78.

(3.) Before I conclude, it may be mentioned that I have been also apprised of the fact of the proceeding pending before the Tribunal. In the given facts and circumstance of the case, I do not find anything unusual or perverse so as to interfere with the impugned order and to declare the appointment of a Special Officer as impermissible in law.