MAHINDRA AND MAH1NDRA LTD Vs. KOHINOOR DEBI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) SECTION 3 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, as it stood before the Amendment of 1965, rendered the provisions of the Act inapplicable to any premises held under a lease for more than 20 years whether the purpose of the lease was residential or non-residential. By the Amendment Act of 1965, this section 3 has been retained and renumbered a sub-section (1) of section 3, but a new sub-section (2) has been added to deal specifically with lease entered into after the commencement of the Ordinance on an from 24/8/1965, which preceded the Amendment Act of 1965, rendering section 3 (1) inapplicable to all leases entered into after that date. Sub-section (2), so inserted, now provides that all leases entered into after 24//65 would not be exempted from, but would be governed by, the provisions of the west Bengal Premises Tenancy Act of 1956 except a lease for "a period of not less than 20 years" provided the same is "not expressed to be terminable before its expiration at the option either of the landlord or of the tenant", in which case such as lease would be governed only by the provisions relating to rents and the provisions of sections 31 and 36 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act providing of penalty for disturbances of easement etc. , and for the tenant's getting supply of electricity even without the consent of the landlord, but by no other provisions of that act. This sub section (2), therefore, has introduced no change in the law in respect of leases entered into before 24/8/65, which are still governed by section 3 as it stood, and section 3 (1), as it now stands, where under nothing in the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act shall apply to "any premises held under a lease" for more than 20 years. The only question involved in this second appeal is as to whether the demised premises were held under such a lease, namely, a lease entered into before the commencement of the Amandment of 1965 on 24/8/65 and was for more than 20 years. An affirmative answer would warrant dismissal passed by the trial Court against the tenant appellant in favour of the landlord-respondent and affirmed by the first Appellate Court, while a negative answer would require us to reverse that decree and the judgments of both the Courts below. We have decided to return an affirmative answer and to dismiss the appeal.

(2.) THE disputed lease was admittedly entered into by a. registered indenture being Exhibit 1, dated 11/4/60 and was palpably "for the term of 21 years certain, commencing an and from the 15th day of December, in the year 1959 and expiring with the expiry of the 4th day of December, 1980". Some terms (not the term) and conditions of this lease, Exhibit 1, were no doubt varied by two subsequent registered instruments, being exhibit 1 (a) dated 5/2/71 and Exhibit 1 (b) dated 7/9/77, but these variations related only to the amount payable as rent for the premises, fittings and fixtures and the Municipal taxes. And in both these two instruments, Exhibit 1 (a) and Exhibit 1 (b), the parties clearly averred, may be ex-majori cautela, that to quote from Exhibit 1 (b), clause 5] "subject to the said variation, the Principal Deed shall remain in full force and effect and shall be read and construed and be enforceable as if the terms of these presents were inserted therein by way of addition or substitution, as the case may be". We accordingly thought that, notwithstanding these variations as aforesaid, the lease under which the demised premises were held, remained and continued to remain a lease for 21 years and as such the demised premises were not to be governed by the provisions of the West Bengal Premises tenancy Act, 1956, because of section 3 (1) thereof. We thought that to be the plain meaning of these plain English words.

(3.) BUT eminent Counsels on both sides took a good number of days to make us understand as to what was the term or the period of the lease, notwithstanding the clear declaration in Exhibit 1 that it was meant to be for 21 years and was also, in fact, held for that period. That reminded us of the classical observations of Vivian Bose, J. , in the Supreme court decision in Seksaria Cotton Mills, AIR 1953 SC 278 at 281-282, that the more learned a person is in law, the more puzzled he might be for it is not till one is learned in the law that subtelties of thought and bewilderment arise at the meaning of plain English words which any man of average intelligence, not versed in the law would have no difficulty in understanding. Both my Lord, Nayak, J. and I, and also the learned judges in the Courts below, did not have any or much difficulty in understanding on a plain reading of Exhibits 1, 1 (a) and 1 (b) that the premises were, as avowedly expressed in Exhibit 1, held under a lease for 21 years. May be, we were not that learned or versed in law and, therefore, did not suffer from any sort of amblyopia resulting from learning in law. Numerous authorities, both judicial and textual, have been referred to by the learned Counsel for both tine parties, but after wading through them as far as we could, we are satisfied that reference to many of then would not at all be necessary and would unnecessarily lengthen our judgment for no useful purpose.