PUNAM CHAND DAGA Vs. SUBHAKARAN DASSANI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These are nine applications for certificates under Article 133 (1) (b) and (c) of the Constitution of India for appeal to the Supreme Court. The applications arise in the following circumstances.

(2.) The petitioner is a monthly tenant under the opposite party in respect of nine tenancies. All the nine tenancies are in respect of different rooms in premises No. 36, Shibtolla Street, Calcutta. The petitioner's landlord served nine ejectment notices in respect of these nine tenancies. As the petitioner failed or omitted to quit and vacate the premises, nine suits for ejectment were filed against him. All the nine suits were tried together and one judgment was delivered covering all the nine suits in November 1959. All the suits were decreed and the petitioner was given three years' time to vacate the premises. The petitioner preferred nine appeals from the original decrees in all the nine suits and on his prayer the appeals were heard analogously by the Court of appeal consisting of my Lord the Chief Justice and myself. All the nine appeals were dismissed with costs by one judgment dated 30th May, 1967. The petitioner now proposes to appeal to the Supreme Court against that judgment and has made the present applications. During the pendency of the applications, the petitioner made another application praying that for the purposes of pecuniary Valuation, there should be an order for Consolidation of these nine applications under Order 45, Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

(3.) Order 45, Rule 4 provides that for the purpose of pecuniary valuation, suits Involving substantially the same questions for determination and decided by the same judgment may be consolidated. In a Full Bench judgment of the Madras High Court in Lakshminarasimha v. Ratnam, AIR 1949 Mad 739 (FB), it was held that where several suits, out of which several appeals arise involving the same questions, were decided by the trial Court by almost the same judgment (though separate judgments were, in fact delivered) and by a common judgment in the first and second appeals, consolidation should be ordered for pecuniary jurisdiction. Nine appeals of the petitioner which were decided by us arise out of almost the same facts. The questions that we decided were also practically of the same nature. From that point of view, there cannot be any objection to consolidation of the nine applications pending before us. But there is one consideration for which we cannot allow this consolidation under Order 45, Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure. All the nine applications before us have been made under Article 133 (1) (b) and (c). None of the applications is under Article 133 (1) (a). Though this is quite clear from the cause title of the applications, we put a specific question on this point to Mr. Ganguli who moved the applications. He told us categorically that his applications were under Article 133 (1) (b) and also under Article 133 (1) (c). We had this statement of Mr. Ganguli recorded by a Minute.