DULAL CHANDRA BHAR Vs. SUKUMAR BANERJEE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) On 17-1-1958, the three appellants before us were committed to jail by an order of N. K. Sen, J., to be detained in simple imprisonment for six months for contempt of this Court and also, it would appear, contempt of the Court of a Magistrate of Barrackpore. Along with the appellants a fourth person, a Police Officer, was also arraigned for contempt and punished by the learned Judge with a fine. He has not appealed. The contempt found against the appellants was violation of an order made by the learned Judge himself in a Criminal Revision Case arising out of a proceeding under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and also, though this is doubtful, some further orders of the Magistrate passed in order to give effect to the learned Judge's order. The appellants contended before' the learned Judge that they hud not been guilty of contempt, but having been convicted, they have now appealed.

(2.) The question, first to bo decided is whether the appeal lies. It can be beld to lie only if it can be shown that the order appealed from is appealable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent and it can be shown to be appealable under that Clause only if it is not an order of one of the excepted kinds and if it amounts to a judgment within the accepted meaning of that term. Two of the exceptions mentioned in Clause 15 may at once be put on one side, because no one can contend that in passing his order, the learned Judge was exercising appellate or revisional jurisdiction. The remaining exception is as to orders passed in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction and the question is whether it was in exercise of that jurisdiction that the learned Judge punished the appellants for contempt. From one point of view it can be said that since the learned Judge undoubtedly passed his original order in the Revision Case in exercise of a criminal jurisdiction, the order for contempt, having been passed merely in aid of the original order, was also passed in exercise of the same jurisdiction. An analysis of the real nature of the order would, however, show that such a contention would not be correct. The jurisdiction to pass an order for contempt is per se neither civil or criminal, but is sui generis. It is, however, well settled that when a Court punishes a person for criminal contempt, he exercises criminal jurisdiction and no appeal lies at all as to the merits of his order, although an appeal on the question of jurisdiction may lie. Where, however, the contempt concerned is civil contempt and the order contains a finding as to the words or deeds which, in the view of the Judge, constituted contempt, an appeal would lie. It has, therefore, to be seen whether the contempt in the present case, assuming contempt was committed, was civil or criminal contempt.

(3.) The line between civil and criminal contempt can be broad as well as thin. Where the contempt consists in mere failure to comply with or carry out an order of a Court made for the benefit of a private party, it is plainly civil contempt and it has been said that when the party, in whose interest the order was made, moves the Court for action to be taken in contempt against the contemner with a view to an enforcement of his right, the proceeding is only a form of execution. In such a case, there is no criminality in the disobedience and the contempt, such as it is, is not criminal. If, however, the contemner adds defiance of the Court to disobedience of the order and conducts himself in a manner which amounts to obstruction to or interference with the course of justice, the contempt committed by him is of a mixed character, partaking as between him and his opponent of the nature of a civil contempt and as between him and the Court or the State, of the nature of a criminal contempt. In cases of this type, no clear distinction between civil and criminal contempt can be drawn and the contempt committed cannot be broadly classed as either civil or criminal contempt. There is, however, a third form of contempt which is purely criminal and which consists in conduct tending to bring the administration of justice to scorn and to interfere with the course of justice as administered by the Courts. Contempt of this class is purely criminal, because it results in an offence or a public wrong, whereas contempt consisting in disobedience of an order made for the benefit of a private individual results only in a private injury. To put the matter in other words, a contempt is merely a civil wrong where there has been disobedience of an order made for the benefit of a particular party, but where it has consisted in setting the authority of the Courts at naught and has had a tendency to invade the efficacy of the machinery maintained by the State for the administration of justice, it is a public wrong and consequently criminal in nature.