DASARATHY BANERJEE Vs. KRIPAL SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is an application for contempt against the three respondents who are respectively, the General Manager, Chief Personal Officer and Divisional Superintendent of Eastern Railway having its Head Office at 17, Netaji Subhas Road. Calcutta. It is said that the respondents and each of them were guilty of a contempt of court, in that there was, on the part of each, a deliberate disobedience of a mandatory injunction issued against the General Manager, Eastern Railway, directing him to with -draw forthwith an order of suspension upon the petitioner. This injunction was passed by a learned Munsif in T.S. 989 of 1955. Instituted by the petitioner against the General Manager, Eastern Railway, and the Union of India. The various claims of the petitioner were allowed by a decree dated the 5th of May, 1958. The text of the decree has been set out in paragraph 4 of the petition.

(2.) MR . Nalin Chandra Banerjee appearing on behalf of the petitioner has contended that the special direction embodied in the decree requiring the General Manager to lift the ban of suspension was deliberately disobeyed. Mr. Banerjee has also contended that although the Union of India as well as respondent No. 1 preferred an appeal against the said decree there was no stay of the operation of the decree or of any of the special directions embodied in that decree, and that the refusal to obey the divers directions contained in the decree constituted a gross contempt of Court. Mr. Banerjee has, lastly, contended that the offence has been aggravated by the fact that the respondents have not apologised for the contempt alleged.

(3.) IN support of his contention, Mr. Banerjee has referred us to Taradas v. Corporation of Calcutta. : AIR1951Cal397 , Ali Mahomed Adamalli v. Emperor, 72 Ind App 226: (AIR 1945 PC 147)) and Narain Singh v. Hardayal Singh, . The learned Advocate has also referred us to Section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act. In our view, neither these decisions nor the provisions of Section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act have any bearing upon the point raised by Mr. Banerjee. His contention is that the learned Munsif's direction to forthwith withdraw the ban of suspension is not subject to the provisions of Section 82 of the Code of Civil Procedure and that the time specified in the section cannot affect the question of a contumacious disregard of an order of injunction passed by a Civil Court In view of the express provisions of Section 82, we must hold that there can be no question of any contempt until the procedure laid down in that section has been exhausted. That being so, we must hold that there has been no contempt of Court on the part of any of the respondents.