SRIDHAR JIEU Vs. CORPORATION OF CALCUTTA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner Sree Sree Sridhar Jieu is the admitted owner of premises which formerly bore Nos. 128, 129, 130, 131/1, 131/2 and 132, Canning Street, on the basis that these were six distinct premises. They were valued for the purposes of assessment of the consolidated rate at Rs. 1360/-, 702/-, 345/-, 518/-, 270/-, 324/- and 810/- respectively and in accordance with the provisions of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951, the assessment of the consolidated rate was at 181/2 per cent. of the annual valuation for premises No. 128 and at 151/2 per cent. of the annual valuation for the other five premises. On the 20th September, 1956, a notice was served on the petitioners stating that it Was proposed to amalgamate these six premises into one premises and allot thereto No. 128. Ultimately, this proposal of amalgamation was carried into effect and the Corporation authorities treated the six premises as one, allotted to it the No. 128 and proceeding thereafter to value it for the purpose of assessment of the rate, issued a notice on the 9th January, 1957 informing the petitioners that the amalgamated premises had been valued at Rs. 4465/-. The petitioners in their attempt to get rid of this have sought the assistance of this Court under the provisions of Article 226 of the Constitution and asked for the issue of a writ of mandamus restraining the respondents from giving effect to the several notices and from forbearing to give effect to the amalgamation of the premises and also a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing the order of amalgamation and for an order restraining the respondents from taking any further action. A Rule as prayed for was issued by Sinha J. but ultimately that Rule has been discharged. It is against this order of discharge that the present appeal has been preferred.

(2.) There is really one question for decision, that is, whether the amalgamation which has been carried out by the Corporation authorities of six separate and distinct premises into one was done under any powers conferred on them by the statute. It is well-settled that when a corporation is created by the legislature of the State, we have to look to the statute creating the corporation not only to find out the purposes for which the corporation has been created but also the powers which the corporation has been vested with. The argument on which the present petitioners based their contention before Sinha J. and again before this Court was that the statute in question, namely, the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951, has not conferred any power on the Corporation authorities to effect any such amalgamation. To this, the respondent, the Corporation of Calcutta, replies that such power, though not expressly given, has been conferred on the Corporation by implication in Section 175 and Clause (i) of the proviso to Section 207 (2). If there has been any such conferment of the power of amalgama ting a number of premises into one, it is only by implication in Section 175 and Clause (i) of the proviso to Section 207(2) of the Calcutta Municipal Act. It is, therefore, not necessary for us to examine the other provisions of the Act in search for any such power. Sinha J. came to the conclusion that though there is no express conferment of any such power, it should be held that by implication the Legislature has given this power of amalgamation to the Corporation authorities. He has not in his judgment in the present case mentioned any detailed reasons for his view but has referred to his previous decision in the case of Arathoon Mackertoon Arathoon v. Corporation of Calcutta, and has said that though in that case he left the point open, he saw no reason to change the opinion which he indicated in that case. Turning to the report of Arathoon's case, I find that Sinha J. was of opinion that the provision for amalgamation was not a provision imposing a tax and consequently the Court is not limited by the actual words of the section but can look further a field to find out what was, intended. Holding on the authorities that where an Act confers a jurisdiction, it impliedly also grants the power of doing all such acts as are essentially necessary to its execution, he held that the power of amalgamation does exist. This is how the learned Judge expresses himself:

(3.) It is easy to see that such sub-division would affect the proceeds of the consolidated rate, as on sub-division, the several premises which have come into existence in place of one premises will be ordinarily assessed to a lesser rate even though the total valuation remains the same. This is the inevitable consequence of the provision as set out earlier that the percentage of valuation at which the consolidated rate will be fixed will rise gradually with the rise of valuation after fixed stages.