KISHORI MOHAN SADHUKHAN Vs. MAJANALI MONDAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This Rule directed against an order of Shri S.K. Chanda, magistrate, first class, Basirhat, dated October 4, 1956, discharging under Section 207A(6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure sixteen opposite parties and refusing to commit them for trial by the Court of Session.

(2.) The police submitted a charge-sheet under Sections 147/ 304 of the Indian Penal Code against the opposite parties and the facts alleged were that in mouza Tepul under Swarupnagar police-station the Petitioner Kishori Mohan Sadhukhan had a plot of land which was popularly known as Subzola Banda. This plot of land included several other c.s. plots all forming one compact area having no ails between them. In 1362 B.S. the Petitioner through his men grew crops in those lands. It was stated that on November 18, 1955. some time in the morning the opposite parties with many others came upon the land variously armed and cut the unripe paddy grown upon the land by the complainant Petitioner. The Petitioner's son Kalo with one Bipin Bala, a neighbour, on arrival at the place objected to the reaping of the paddy whereupon the opposite parties severely assaulted Bipin Bala, who fell down on the land unconscious. Halo cried for help and some neighbours arrived there and apprehended o.p. No. 6, Zeher Mondal, on the spot. Bipin as also Zeher Mondal, opposite party No. 5, were then brought to a neighbouring house where the choukidar was sent for. The injured man was thereafter sent to Habra health centre, where he died on the next day.

(3.) It appears that in course of an enquiry under Chapter XVIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure the learned magistrate examined 13, witnesses in support of the prosecution case. Although no less than 9 witnesses were examined as eye-witnesses, the learned magistrate proceeded to enquire in accordance with the provisions of Section 207A of the Code, preliminary to commitments for trial by the Court of Session. He pointed out in his judgment that of the 25 witnesses cited by the prosecution, he examined only 13 and of these 13, 8 were witnesses to the occurrence. He scrutinised the evidence given before him and according to him there were certain circumstances which cast a spell of doubt on the entire case, for example, he pointed out that prosecution witness No. 8 stated that he did not notice blood marks on the paddy field, but almost all the witnesses stated that immediately after the assault Bipin fell on the ground and lay unconscious for some time, when P.W. 11 examined the deceased after about 12 hours, the injured was still bleeding from nose and vomiting blood. From these circumstances alone the learned magistrate was of the view that the entire case could not be true. Then, again, he took serious note of the fact that some of the witnesses who were examined as eye-witness were not produced before the investigating officer at an earlier stage and there was no explanation why the police did not examine them earlier. On the credibility of witnesses the defence argued that they were not witnesses of truth and the learned magistrate found that there was a ring of truth in the argument of the defence. Then, again, on observing the demeanour of certain witnesses the learned magistrate came to the conclusion that they were thoroughly unworthy of credence. The learned magistrate further proceeded to consider whether the witnesses were interested in the success of the case and came to the conclusion that the testimony of certain witnesses were highly interested. He found that their evidence contained concoctions of truths, half truths and untruths. This he found on a comparison of the statements with the police diary. He described the complainant to be a great liar. To sum up the above illustrations it may be pointed out that the learned magistrate thought that his business was to separate corn and chaff and thereafter piece fragments of true facts together which found corroboration in the statements of both the parties. According to him some evidence was reliable and some was not. Having thus assessed the evidence he discharged the opposite parties under Section 207A(6) of the Code.