TAPAN (TAPPU) BHOWMICK Vs. STATE OF WEST BENGAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The appellant has been convicted of offences under the provisions of Sections 302 and 498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and sentenced by the Trial Court to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life for the former offence and imprisonment of similar character for three years in respect of the latter. Sentence of the appellant includes direction to pay fine of Rs.4,000/- as punishment for each of the offences of which he has been convicted. In default thereof, further rigorous imprisonment for six months has been prescribed for his conviction under Section 302 of the 1860 Code and for forty days in relation to the other offence. Charge against the accused is having committed murder of his wife, Sabita Bhowmick as well as treating the victim after their marriage with cruelty by torturing her both physically and mentally.

(2.) Case of the prosecution, which was sustained by the Trial Court, is that while accompanying his wife to a "Jatra" (a form of indigenous theatre) at "Haripat" on the night of 2nd January, 2002, the appellant had attacked her on the way and injured her head and several other parts of the body with bricks. Their matrimonial home was at mouza Uttar Lou Chapra under Dinhati Police Station in the district of Cooch Behar. Subsequently he took the injured victim to their matrimonial home and there she was confined in a room locked from outside. The victim's groaning sound in agony had alerted other relatives who used to reside close by. The lock was broken and the injured victim was initially taken to the nearby primary health centre at Bamanhat, from where she was transferred to Dinhata sub-divisional hospital on 3rd January, 2002 on being referred by the attending doctor at that primary health centre. The victim succumbed to her injuries in the sub-divisional hospital after brief treatment at 11.35 A.M. on the same day. The attending doctors at both the clinical establishments have given evidence that the victim had told them that she was assaulted by the appellant. The autopsy surgeon, Dr. D.K. Khara (P.W. 13) in the post-mortem report opined hemmorrhagic necrogenic shock, ante-mortem in nature to be the cause of death of the victim. There was no observation by the autopsy surgeon as to whether the victim's death was homicidal or accidental nature. Another doctor, Ratan Barman (P.W. 26) who had examined the patient at the sub-divisional hospital, stated in his deposition, after explaining the nature of injuries suffered by the victim that such types of injuries might be inflicted by hard instruments. In cross-examination, however, he also stated that "such injury might be inflicted by sudden falling on bed...." The case was started on the basis of a written complaint of one Kanak Ranjan Roy (P.W. 2) on 3rd January, 2002 itself. In the written complaint he described himself as Upa pradhan of the local gram panchayat. The complaint was received at 235 hours on the night of 3rd January 2002 and in this complaint the appellant was named as the assailant.

(3.) There was no eye-witness to the actual act of assault. Finding of guilt and conviction by the Trial Court is based on circumstantial evidence. The Trial Court has primarily relied on statements of the victim narrated by two medical practitioners treating her, by which she attributed her injuries to assault by her husband, the appellant. Such statements of the victim were in the nature of dying declarations. These two medical practitioners were Dr. Amitava Barman (P.W. 23), who at the material point of time was attached to the Bamanhat primary health centre and Dr. S. Mandal (P.W. 25). The latter treated the victim at the sub-divisional hospital. The defence stand before the Trial Court was his innocence and it was emphasised that he was absent from the place of occurence at the material time. In his reply to examination under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the appellant took a stand that he had been implicated in a false case and that he was not at home. Altogether 31 witnesses were examined by the prosecution, of whom 12 were witnesses of fact. We shall deal in this judgment the evidences of those witnesses only which we find relevant and necessary for adjudication of this appeal. There were several routine witnesses and also witnesses whose depositions are inconsequential and we shall avoid referring to their depositions in this judgment.