KRISHNA GUPTA Vs. STATE BANK OF INDIA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal arises out of Order No.3 dated 17th February, 1994 passed by the learned second Assistant District Judge, Alipore, in title suit No.10 of 1994. By the impugned order, the learned Judge, while issuing notice upon the present defendant/appellant, granted an interim order for maintenance of status quo on the basis of a prayer, made on behalf of the plaintiff/respondent, inter alia, seeking to restrain the defendant/appellant from disposing of, depleting, encumbering or dealing with the suit property. While disposing of an application for interim order, in connection with the present appeal, a Division Bench of this court permitted the appellant to realise the subsidy but directed that the realised amount be deposited in a Nationalised Bank and prevented the appellant from withdrawing the same without specific order from this court.

(2.) Before us, in course of hearing of the present appeal, a preliminary objection was taken as to the jurisdiction of this court to hear because of the provisions of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act).

(3.) We have heard Mr. Anindya Mitra, in support of the appeal and Mr. Subrata Roy, on behalf of the Bank respondent. Admittedly, the suit, out of which the present appeal arises, is one for recovery of alleged debts of the appellant/defendant to the Bank. The suit was instituted in the year 1994 and the Tribunal under the said Act was established on 27th April, 1994, i.e. after the institution of the suit. In terms of section 17 of the Act the Tribunal shall have, inter alia, jurisdiction to entertain and decide application for Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions. In terms of sub-section (2) appellate tribunal shall have authority to entertain appeal against any order by a Tribunal under this Act. "Application in terms of clause (b) of sub-section (2) means an application under Section 19 of the said Act." Section 31 of the said Act by sub-section (1) provides for transfer of a pending suit or other proceeding to the Tribunal on the date of establishment of the Tribunal; by proviso thereof the operation of sub-section (1) has been excluded from applying to appeals pending before any court immediately before such date of establishment of a Tribunal. In the instant case the Tribunal was established on 27th April 1994 whereas the appeal was presented before this court on 8th April, 1994. In the first place, because of the clear language of the proviso, the present appeal is entertainable by this court. Secondly, since there is no confusion in the language used by the legislature, the word 'pending' should be given its ordinary literal meaning as has been accepted by the apex court in a number of cases namely that it is not concluded and court make orders in it. References for authorities may be made to the cases of Asgarali Nazarali Singaporewalla v. State of Bombay reported in AIR 1957 Supreme Court 503; R.R. Chari v. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in AIR 1962 Supreme Court 1573 and Lt. Col S.K. Kashyap and another v. State of Rajasthan reported in AIR 1971 Supreme Court 1120. The fact of the appeal being not admitted prior to 27.7.94 is of no consequence. For the aforesaid reasons we hold that this court has jurisdiction to entertain the appeal and we dispose of the preliminary point accordingly B.M. Mitra, J.-I agree Later:--On the prayer, made by Mr. Mitra, we treat the appeal as on day's list dispensing with all further formalities. We have considered the submissions made by Mr. Mitra, whose client is the respondent before us, and who succeeded before the trial court. Upon hearing such submissions, we are of the view that the order impugned in the appeal cannot stand in law being directly contrary to the ratio of the decision of the apex court in the case of Shiv Kumar Chhadha v. Delhi Municipal Corporation reported in 1993 0 SCC 161, we accordingly set aside the impugned order and allow the appeal to that extent. The application for interim relief may now be heard by the appropriate authority before whom the proceeding is pending, upon reasonable opportunity being given to the contesting parties. The records may be send down forthwith. There will be no order as to costs. The interim order dated 20.4.94 would stand vacated. Xerox certified copies of this order may be handed over to the applicant parties, if urgently applied for, within 10 days of the deposit of the requisite stamps and folios. Appeal allowed