LAWS(CAL)-1987-9-8

SHYAMALI SARKAR Vs. ASHIM KUMAR SARKAR

Decided On September 18, 1987
SHYAMALI SARKAR Appellant
V/S
ASHIM KUMAR SARKAR Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) A petition by the applicant-wife for restitution of conjugal rights under S.9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, dismissed by the trial court, has been decreed by this Court on appeal. The wife has now filed this application in this Court under S.25 of the Hindu Marriage Act for permanent alimony. In opposing this application, Mr. Bachawat, the learned Counsel for the husband/opposite party, has urged that this Court cannot entertain this application which is to be filed in the 'District Court' in accordance with the provisions of S.19 of the Hindu Marriage Act. Mr. Bachawat has submitted that the present application ought to have been filed in the City Civil Court which is the 'District Court' within the meaning of the Act, where the original petition for restitution of conjugal rights was presented in accordance with S.19 of the Act. For better appreciation and facility of discussion, the relevant portions of S.19 and S.25 of the Act are reproduced hereinabove :-

(2.) Mr. Bachawat has urged that an application under S.25 of the Hindu Marriage Act is nevertheless a "petition under this Act" within the meaning of S.19 and must, therefore, be filed in the 'District Court' (here, the City Civil Court) under and in accordance with S.19.

(3.) The expressions "application" and "petition", though sometimes used indiscriminately to denote the something, have different connotations also. An "application" for example, unless otherwise expressly provided, may even be oral, as would appear, for example, from the provisions of Art.134A of the Constitution, the provisions of R.11, O.21 of the Civil P.C. and the catena of cases decided under S.5 of the Limitation Act. But a "petition" must and cannot but be in writing. That these two expressions have different connotations, would also appear from the provisions of S.2(a) and (b) of the Limitation Act of 1963; for otherwise, even as late as in 1963, those clauses would not have expressly defined the word "application" to include a "petition" and the word "applicant" to include a "petitioner". When a statutory definition defines "A" to include "B", then ordinarily, though not invariably, the implication is that "A" would not have, but for such definition, included "B". While recommending the insertion of these new definitions in the Limitation Act of 1963, the Law Commission in its Second Report on Limitation (S.9, page 5) observed that "the object is to provide a period of limitation for original petitions and applications under special laws". These observations would also indicate that the word petition, when used in juxtaposition to the word application, would mean petitions of original nature, that is, petitions which would initiate and found proceedings of original nature which are independent of and not consequential to any other proceedings.