JAGJIT SINGH KHANNA Vs. RAKHAL DAS MULLICK

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The plaintiff, who is respondent 1 before us, filed an application under the provisions of O.39, Civil P.C., praying for a temporary mandatory injunction against defendant 1, who is respondent 2 before us and a temporary prohibitory injunction against defendant 2, who is the appellant before us. The trial court issued notices to the defendants to show cause as to why such injunctions shall not be granted, but refused the prayer for ad interim injunction.

(2.) Within a week thereafter defendant 1 appeared and prayed for time to file his show cause. The plaintiff has then filed another application under the provisions of S.94 of the Code renewing his prayer for ad interim injunction against defendant 1 and on consent of both the parties, the trial Court has allowed the application under S.94 of the Code and has granted ad interim injunction "till the final disposal of the application under O.39, Rr.1 and 2, C.P.C." and has stated in the impugned order that "the petition under S.94, C.P.C., be thus disposed of".

(3.) It seems that the trial Court in refusing ad interim injunction under an application labelled as one under O.39 of the Code and thereafter in granting ad interim injunction on an application purporting to be under S.94 of the Code "till the final disposal of the application under O.39, Rr.1 and 2, C.P.C.", proceeded under the impression that the Code clothes the Courts with two sources of power to grant temporary injunction, one under S.94 of the Code and the other under O.39 of the Code. The impression is wholly erroneous as would appear from a bare perusal of the provisions of S.94(c) of the Code whereunder the Court may grant a temporary injunction only "if it is so prescribed". The expression "prescribed" in S.94 would obviously mean, as defined in S.2(16) of the Code, "prescribed by Rules". The Rules which prescribe grant of temporary injunction are R.1 and R.2 of O.39 and, therefore, a temporary injunction may be granted under S.94(c) only if a case satisfying the requirements of Rr.1 and 2, O.39 is made out. As already noted not that the Court has two sources of power, one under S.94(c) and another under O.39 of the Code and may resort to one or the other as and when necessary, but that under the Code the Court grants temporary injunction only under one set of provisions, namely, S.94(c) read with O.39, Rr.1 and 2 of the Code. It is true that, as pointed out by the Supreme Court in Manohar Lal v. Seth Hiralal, AIR 1962 SC 527, a Court can grant temporary injunction in exercise of its inherent powers also, but there it does not grant it under any power conferred by the Code but under powers inhering in its very constitution which are saved by and under S.151 of the Code. The words "a temporary injunction granted under the last preceding Section" in S.95 of the Code indicate that temporary injunction is granted under the provisions of S.94, but the words "any injunction granted... under R.1 or R.2" in R.2A of O.39 may give rise to the impression that a temporary injunction may be granted independently under the provisions of O.39, Rr.1 and 2 also. But, as already indicated, under the Code a temporary injunction can be granted only under one set of provisions namely, under S.94(c) read with O.39, Rr.1 and 2.