GUNADHAR SANTRA Vs. DISTRICT MAGISTRATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This Rule was issued by our brothers R.N. Dutt and N.C. Talukdar, JJ. on September 4, 1967, upon an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and also under Sec. 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure made by Gunadhar Santra, praying for a writ in the nature of habeas corpus in respect of the detenu Bishnupada Santra who is now being detained in the Midnapore Central Jail by dint of an order made by the District Magistrate of Midnapore in exercise of his powers under Sec. 3(2) of the Preventive Detention Act of 1950 (IV of 1950). The Rule on being issued has been served on the three Respondents, i.e., the District Magistrate, Midnapore, the Superintendent of Midnapore Central Jail and also the State of West Bengal. The Learned Deputy Legal Remembrancer, Mr. Sambhunath Banerjee, has appeared on behalf of the Respondents, but there has not been filed any affidavit on behalf of the Respondents by way of making a return to the Rule. The learned Deputy Legal Remembrancer mentions the reasons why he has advised the parties he is representing not to use any affidavit; those reasons will appear when we deal with the merits of the case later.

(2.) The order of detention was made by the District Magistrate, Midnapore, Sri S. Chatterjee, on August 17, 1967, and copy thereof has been annexed to the petition moved in this Court as annEx. 'A'. The learned Deputy Legal Remembrancer has also produced before us the original order No. 345C dated Midnapore, August 17, 1967. The order is in these terms:

(3.) Mr. Sankardas Banerjee, appearing in support of the Rule, has drawn our attention not only to the order of detention above quoted, but also to the grounds of detention for contending that some of the grounds are couched in language which is so vague as would not enable the detenu to make an effective representation against the order of detention. We need not go into that question about the vagueness of the grounds of detention, because our task has been simplified by the learned Deputy Legal Remembrancer himself by drawing our attention to the terms of the order of detention itself. It is pointed out that in the text of that order instead of saying 'with a view to preventing' what appears, both in the copy that was served on the detenu as also the original produced before us by the learned Deputy Legal Remembrancer from the Government file is 'with a view to performing'. Besides that inaccuracy we have to notice also that the first paragraph commencing with the words 'Whereas I am satisfied' ends with the words 'it is necessary so to do' and both in the original as also in the copy served on the detenu there appears a full stop after the word 'do'. We asked the learned Deputy Legal Remembrancer what would be the matter of which this first paragraph of the order mentions the satisfaction of the District Magistrate about. The learned Deputy Legal Remembrancer in his accustomed fairness conceded that by the effect of the full stop after the word 'do' there has been brought about the effect not only that the satisfaction mentioned in the first paragraph is disconnected from the order of detention that appears in the second paragraph of the order, but also the sentence in the first paragraph bears no meaning at all; because of the effect of the full stop after the word 'do', the phrase 'so to do' stands disjuncted from the second paragraph and no meaning can be attributed to what is meant by the word 'so'.