UNION OF INDIA Vs. MAKHANLAL DEY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The doctrine of sufficient cause (a convenient, rather an imprecise expression) in Sec. 5 of the Indian Limitation Act both of the years 1908 and 1963, is one, which has throughout the history of its subject matter, been expressed with considerable generality. The best known formulations, those of Lord Dunedin in the case of (1) Brij Inder v/s. Kanshi Ram, 44 I.A. 218 :, A.I.R. (1917) P.C. 156 and of Sir John Edge in the case of (2) Sunder Bai v/s. Collector of Belgaum,, 46 I.A. 15 :, A.I.R. (1918) P.C. 135, adapted in this context by P. N. Mookerjee, and Bijayesh Mukherjee, JJ. in the case of (3) Chanaramuli v/s. Goenka : 67 C.W.N. 482 and used by P. N. Mookerjee and Niyogi JJ. in the case of (4) Ram Charitar v/s. Nagendra : 64 C.W.N. 223, which I had the privilege of arguing when at the bar, speak generally of the causes, sufficient to condone the delay, without any attempt at a particular definition. I am not prepared to refine upon them with any dialectical subtleties, as cases on this Sec. under the statute arose and would arise in future in infinite diversity of circumstances. The concurrence of experienced opinions however is enough, without any additional attempt of my own, to review the subject -matter over again in detail. Often we find, the said expression 'sufficient cause' used indifferently to denote, on the one hand in a broad popular sense, and on the other, used as a term of art, which may be regarded as offending judicial discretion. In a few reported cases we also find that instead of segregating the two questions (i) whether it was a gross and inexcusable mistake of a lawyer (ii) whether, it was the applicant's careless choice of a lawyer : the Courts confused the two, by asking whether it was a case of a mistaken advice or by arriving at a compound finding that it is not satisfied that ignorance of law is not a sufficient cause. There is no need to regret these tendencies, indeed to do so, when consideration of this subject has passed through many notable minds from Mr. S. Erskine in the case of (5) Bhaee Chund v/s. Purtab Chund,, 1 M.I.A. 154 onwards, would indicate a failure to understand its exact and precise nature. This doctrine of sufficient cause, in my mind, has (some times unconsciously), thrived on ambiguity and it would be mistaken, even if it were possible, to try to crystallise its rules or its aspects into neat definite propositions. It is one which is to be applied to factual situations of a particular case as examined in detail in the instant case by my learned brother, which I forbear from repeating, with a broad and flexible rule of judicial discretion and I desire to guard against the dangerous ambition of wishing to regulate and to foresee everything.

(2.) This again does not mean that there would be no degree of any certainty that the doctrine does or does not apply to a given set of facts. It is also not to be supposed or encouraged that a bare allegation of sufficient cause is enough. Positively, there are certain sensitive areas as to which the law will require in a case, the test of sufficient cause to be passed. Such an area has long been and still is that of utter negligence, carelessness, bad faith of the applicant, his misconduct, his initial approach to the lawyer being not bona -fide and the like. Negatively, there are types of cases (and it is one of this that principally concerns us here) such as no inaction of the applicant, no lack of his bonafides, diligence and due care no gross want of legal skill and laches of his lawyer, no case of deliberate mistake and callous misfortune and the like : as to which the Court should be prepared to say with some confidence that they do not enter into the field. The tests are briefly expressed and I hope that I do justice to them if I say further that the Court should also endeavour to keep it in mind that hardship, undue generosity and maudlin sympathy are no grounds of sufficient cause and that there should not be concealment or suppression of material facts.

(3.) There may be some exorbitant or special features in an individual case, even in types of cases, where they obtained acceptance, but we are to call for a fresh examination of circumstances in each case, which might take it out of the accepted category. Some such limitation on the meaning of sufficient cause must surely have been present to the mind of Subba Rao J. (as his Lordships then was) speaking for the Supreme Court, in the case of (6) Partha Sarathy v/s. State of Andhra Pradesh : A.I.R. (1966) S.C. 38, before whom all the facts must have been stated; but we get in paragraph 5 of the said report at page 40, observation on the skeleton facts and the sole reasons given by the applicant to the effect that "he thought" that he would get the time in obtaining the certified copy, of the order refusing leave to appeal to the Supreme Court as "he was wrongly informed of the practice of this Court", which was, according to the learned Judge, was nothing but a "vague allegation" in the affidavit and, therefore, their Lordships could not be persuaded to condone the delay of 62 days. Moreover, the decision is a compound one in that it mainly decided the application of the provisions of Sec. 12 (2) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963, to the facts of the said case.