A T ANTUNIS Vs. BHUPENDRA NATH BISWAS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This petition in revision is directed against an order of a Small Cause Court Judge striking out the defence of the petitioner under section 14(4) of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act, 1950 on the ground that he failed to make deposits of rent, month by month by the 15th of the month following. The facts briefly are that during the pendency of the suit instituted by the opposite party for ejectment of the petitioner from the premises in question an application was made by the opposite party landlord under section 14(4) and the defendant petitioner was directed to deposit rent month by month from Jan., 1954 by the 15th of the month following. Then the suit was decreed. There was an appeal from that decree by the present petitioner and the appellate court confirmed one of the findings of the trial court, set aside the other finding, namely, that the defendant petitioner was a defaulter together with the decree passed by him and sent the matter back to the trial court on remand. The contention on behalf of the landlord opposite party before the learned trial court was that as soon as the suit was sent back the order under section 14 (4) already made by the trial court revived and the learned trial court agreed with that and in view of the fact that the petitioner failed to deposit rent according to that direction month by month alter the decree had been passed he directed the defence of the petitioner to be struck off.

(2.) The question that really arises in this case is whether on a decree being passed in favour of the landlord opposite party the order under section 3 4(4) automatically ceases to have effect and if it docs not cease to have effect, there is no question of its revival and it would continue so long as the tenant is in occupation of the premises and consequently liable to pay rent. There is nothing in section 14 (4) itself even to suggest that when a decree is passed in favour of the plaintiff landlord directing the eviction of the tenant defendant the order made under section 14(4) of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act, 1950 automatically ceases to have effect. Of course, after the decree is passed in the suit directing the eviction of the tenant defendant there is no question of the defence of the defendant against ejectment being struck off, or in other words, after the decree the penalty attaching: to the failure of the tenant to carry out the direction of the court as regards deposit of rent month by month by the 15th of the month following would have no effect. But that does not mean that the direction itself regarding the deposit of rent month by month by the 15th of the month following would cease to have effect. In saying this I am not unmindful of sub-section 5 under which the appellate court is given the same powers as the trial court under sub-section (4). That, however, may mean either or both of two things. It may mean that the appellate court can exercise that power where the trial court has not done so, or it may mean that even after the trial court has exercised that power the appellate court can also make an order if it thinks necessary and by way of abundant caution. In any case, there is nothing in subsection (5) to suggest that as soon as the decree is passed in an ejectment suit directing the eviction of the tenant defendant the order under subsection (4) of section 14 automatically ceases to have effect. If this is correct, then the order made by the trial court under sub-section (4) continued to be effective even after the decree was passed and even when the appeal was filed and pending. It was of course open to the appellate court to set aside that order if it thought fit, but it did not do so in this case. That being so. that order must be deemed to have continued to be effective even after the decree was passed and after the suit was remanded by the appellate court As the present petitioner admittedly failed to comply with that direction, his defence against ejectment was properly struck off.

(3.) The petition must accordingly be dismissed and the Rule discharged. I make no order as to costs of circumstances of this case.